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IV. Argument
Holmes's opposition brief shows that the Court below could not properly have
granted summary judgment because there were questions of fact. Further, Utah Code Ann.
§57-1-12 establishes a lawful claim requirement not met here so that the lower court's
decision is erroneous as a matter of law.
A. MATTERS RAISED BELOW DENIED BY RESPONDENT.
Holmes argues that the October 6th, 1997 transcript was omitted from the transcript
order. That inadvertent omission has been corrected by Appellant. The additional
transcript reveals that all of the matters which Mr. Maak claims were not raised below
were argued in that hearing. Specifically, Mr. Spencer's limitation on title, Holmes's
knowledge of potential defects in the title, the fact that this matter is not being brought by
Holmes but by its title insurer who is bound by a contract of indemnification which limits
Mr. Spencer's liability, were all raised in that hearing.l In addition, Holmes's brief
overstates its case authority related to this issue. Although at page 25 of his brief he
argues ''evidence not submitted to the Court prior to its ruling on summary judgment or
properly rejected by the Court may not be considered on appeal." his cases do not support
that. The primary authority, Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App.
1994) states that it is within a judge's discretion to accept or reject supplementary
evidence. But that is not at issue here. The documents were argued to the court, shown to
the court, and ultimately entered into the record. Holmes's second case, Territorial Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1989). holds merely that "evidence not
available to the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal." The evidence was
available and is in the record, it just was not considered.

1

10/6/99 Transcript 19:20 - 20:8.
5

Holmes asserts that the occupying claimant statute was not raised below. Paragraph
40 et seq. of the Complaint specifically allege the elements of the occupying claimant
statute as contained in Utah Code Annotated § 57-6-1, et seq. Allegations of holding under
color of title, making of valuable improvements, disputed ownership, and the good faith (or
lack thereof) of the owner are all in the complaint. The fact that plaintiffs omitted the
statute number does not mean that the prima facie case was not plead.
As to Holmes argument that the question of prohibited relief requested by Plaintiffs
was not raised below, Holmes is mentioned in the Complaint only in paragraphs 46, 47, 48
and 51. Those paragraphs are in the count seeking possession of the property. Mr. Spencer
filed a Motion to Dismiss the entire Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). None of the cases
which Holmes has cited have a requirement that a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim must explicitly identify every argument that might be urged. The
fundamental nature of such a motion is that there is nothing in the Complaint to support
any claim. Illegality is one such basis. Furthermore, the order granting summary judgment
drafted by Holmes's counsel, finds that there was no basis for the Complaint as to
Holmes. It is the law of the case, established by the summary judgment dismissing
Holmes,2 that Plaintiffs had no factual or legal basis for bringing Holmes into this matter.
Mr. Spencer's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was therefore well founded.
B. ADMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT WHICH NEGATE IMPOSITION OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST MR. SPENCER.
Holmes's brief makes the following admissions that establish that Mr. Spencer
ought not be liable to the title insurance company for payment of his legal fees:
Plaintiffs only claim against Holmes was for ownership of the property (page 4
"nature of the case").

2

Order granting summary judgment against plaintiffs, R. 681-690
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The chain of title on the property is regular and proper (page 6, paragraph 1).
On all issues in the case related to Holmes there was no factual dispute and Holmes
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law ("issues" pages 6 and 7).
The only issues as to Holmes were (1) whether Holmes had knowledge or notice of
Plaintiffs1 claims against the property, (2) whether or not the transaction from SpencerGamble Development to Spencer were unauthorized or otherwise challengeable, and (3)
whether the Plaintiffs had possession of the property within seven years (pages 6 and 7).
All of those issues were resolved, without dispute of fact, against the Plaintiffs.
Holmes was a bona fide purchaser (page 7). There was an issue of fact before the
Court as to whether or not Mr. Spencer offered to defend Holmes (page 9 footnote 3).
There were no monetary claims against Holmes.
The significance of those facts is as follows:
1. Mr. Spencer Did Mount a Defense that Covered Holmes
Spencer's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint should have been granted at the
inception of the case, at the very least as to Holmes. All of the factors decided in the
summary judgment dismissing the case as to Holmes existed at the moment the Complaint
was filed. All of the rulings of the court; that the chain of title was regular, that there was
no legal notice to Holmes, and that plaintiffs had not been seized of the property within
seven years, were all present in the pleadings. Most, if not all, of those facts were actually
determinable from Plaintiffs own Complaint. Therefore, when Mr. Spencer filed his
Motion to Dismiss, that motion included all of the matters which ultimately got Holmes
dismissed from the case.
2. Mr. Spencer did not breach his warranty of title.
The case cited by Holmes, Bloom v. Hendricks, 804 P.2d 1069, 1073-4 (NM 1991),
states the warranty of title is merely that the seller has title that can be legally transferred
and not defeated. The Court has determined the chain of title was regular and proper. It
7

found there were no factual issues in dispute as to plaintiffs" claims against Holmes. It
found Holmes was not on notice, that the conveyances were authorized and
unchallengeable. And it found there had been no possession by Plaintiffs within seven
years. These findings demonstrate Mr. Spencer did have title to convey and did convey it
and there was no legal or factual basis on which that title could be questioned.
The cited case contains the following statements:
The general effect of a warranty covenant is that the grantor agrees
to compensate the grantee for any loss suffered by reason of the failure of
title which the deed purports to convey. 6A R. Powell, The Law of Real
Property para. 900[2][d] (1990).3

The majority of these decisions recognize that, as a legitimate
outcome of any failure of title, the grantee may recover his costs of
defense, including reasonable attorney fees. These costs are held to be a
proper element of damages. Id. at 162.
Recovery of costs usually is not allowed, however, when a
defense by the grantee is successful. See, e.g., Annotation, Liability of
Grantor in Deed with Covenants, for Expense of Grantee's Successful
Litigation with Third Party, 105 A.L.R. 729, 731 (1936); 7 G. Thompson,
Commentaries on the Law of Real Property 3204 (1962); 20 Am. Jur. 2d
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 151 (1965); see also McDonald v.
Delhi Saw Bank, 440 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1989); Double L. Properties, Inc.
v. Crandall 51 Wash. App. 149, 751 P.2d 1208 (1988) (dictum): Booker T
Washington Constr. & Design Co. v. Huntington Urban Renewal Auth., 383
S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1989). Courts have reached this conclusion by
interpreting the grantor's promise to defend against "lawful" claims as
a promise to defend only against claims that in fact establish
paramount title. Consequently, where the grantee has successfully
defeated the adverse claim and no paramount title has been established,
the grantor cannot be held to have breached either the covenant of title
or his promise to defend.4 (Emphasis by holding added.)

3

Id at 1073.

4

Id at 1074
8

Another case cited by Holmes also shows the duty to defend is much more
restricted than is being argued by Holmes. Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d
403, 404 (Utah 1970) states:
The majority rule, with which we are in accord, is that there is a
breach of warranty when it is shown that the grantor did not own the
land that he purported to convey by the warranty deed description. ..
The covenants involved are of seizin and of good right to convey the
property, which for the purposes considered in this case, are
synonymous; and the breach thereof is made out by a showing that
those rights did not exist in the grantor, .. and it is not necessary to show
an actual eviction or threat thereof. .. However, even though the grantee is
entitled to the peaceable possession and enjoyment of the property he
purchases in accordance with the warranties, ... he is entitled only to the
damage he suffers as a result of the breach thereof, but this includes
taking such measures as are reasonable and necessary to clear up any
difficulty which would represent a substantial flaw in his title. (Emphasis
added, footnotes omitted.)
In this case it has been established as a matter of law5 that Mr. Spencer did have the
right to convey the property and therefore the covenant has not been breached.
Furthermore, as is discussed elsewhere herein, the cause of any loss suffered here is not the
actions of Mr. Spencer, but the action of plaintiffs below who brought a spurious claim In
that connection, Holmes pled for, but did not pursue, a judgment against plaintiffs for the
fees that it now seeks from Mr Spencer.
C. HOLMES ADMITS THAT THE LOWER COURT RESOLVED A
QUESTION OF FACT AGAINST MR. SPENCER TO COME TO ARRIVE
AT ITS DECISION HERE APPEALED.
There were several disputed, material facts that weie resolved by the lower court
against Mr Spencer in order to reach the result below. Those disputed material facts
include: 1 Whether there was the offer of a defense by Mr. Spencer. 2. Whether the fees

Order granting summary judgment against plaintiffs, R. 681-690
9

incurred were necessary. 3. Whether the fees incurred were reasonable. 4. Whether there
was a reasonable opportunity was given to Mr. Spencer to undertake a defense. All of
those factual questions were supported on Mr. Spencer's side by affidavits and admissible
evidence.6 All were decided against Mr. Spencer.
Mr. Spencer's affidavit, filed in opposition to Holmes's motion for summary
judgment against him, states:7

6

1.

I am an adult, competent in all respects to testify before this court
and have direct personal knowledge of all matters affirmed herein.

2.

When I was served with the complaint in this matter I contacted
Mr. Robbie McKowan of Holmes and offered to defend Holmes.
I received no response to that offer. I also directed my attorney,
Mr. Willardson to take every action feasible to defend Holmes and
obtain a prompt dismissal of the action as to Holmes. All documents
filed on my behalf in this case were drafted with the idea of
removing Holmes from the suit and defending their title to the
property. I had numerous discussions on this subject with Mr.
Willardson and in every instance where we had a practicable
opportunity to attempt to defend Holmes or attempt to get them
dismissed from the action, we took that action. Notwithstanding
my willingness and efforts to defend Holmes, Holmes elected to
procure their own attorney and elected to keep all
communications related to their defense between themselves and
Mr. Maak. It was solely because of Holmes unilateral action
that less than all of Holmes' title defense was handled by me and
counsel obtained by me.

3.

I paid for a title insurance policy in connection with a sale of the
property to protect Holmes1 title. To my knowledge, Holmes has
never contacted the insurer or made a claim on this matter.

In addition, Holmes asserts that it was appropriate to tax Mr. Spencer with Holmes's
attorney fees because Mr. Spencer 'knew about the problem' before he passed title.
Holmes's counsel specifically acknowledged to the lower court that such fact was
disputed. 10/6/99 transcript p. 20, lines 17-21.

7

R. 761-763
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4.

I have, since Holmes' was dismissed from this case, contacted Mr.
McKowan to suggest ways of helping Holmes' recoup any funds
they expended in defense. That offer has, like my offer of assistance
with defense of the action, been ignored. It is my belief, based upon
those facts, that Holmes has not paid for any legal services in this
regard.

5.

I believe that the fees being sought here are both unreasonable and
unnecessary. Had Holmes accepted my offer to defend them they
would not have been incurred at all and since Holmes' attorney
has apparently expended almost twice what my attorney has,
while defending a narrower set of issues, the amount of the fees
seems excessive.

6.

We denied paragraph 7 of Holmes' cross-claim because Holmes
ignored my offer and never provided either my attorney or I
with any communication which would allow us to defend them
beyond what was done. We did file motions to dismiss,
undertook discovery, and did all other acts we could to remove
Holmes from the suit, including joining in the motion for
summary judgment which ultimately succeeded in
accomplishing that end.

7.

Plaintiffs were not parties to the suit in which a lis pendens was once
filed upon the property and were not named in any way therein.
(Emphasis added.)

Mr. Willardson's affidavit, which was also filed in opposition to the motion
appealed here,8 states:

8

1.

I am an adult, competent in all respects to testify before this court
and have direct personal knowledge of all matters affirmed herein.

2.

My client, Mr. Spencer, has consistently directed me to take
every action feasible to defend Holmes and obtain a prompt
dismissal of the action as to Holmes. I have followed that
direction. All documents filed on my behalf in this case were
drafted with the idea of removing Holmes from the suit and
defending their title to the property. In every instance where we
had a practicable opportunity to attempt to defend Holmes or attempt
to get them dismissed from the action, we took that action.
Notwithstanding, my efforts to defend Holmes, Holmes elected to

R. 779-781
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procure their own attorney and elected to keep all communications
related to their defense between themselves and Mr. Maak. It was
solely because of Holmes unilateral action that less than all of
Holmes' title defense was handled by me.
3.

I spent a maximum of 73.25 hours during 1997 and a maximum
of 57.25 hours during 1998 and 1999 doing all of the same things
as were done by Holmes' counsel in this action, as well as taking
care of additional matters, such as the motions to dismiss that
were prosecuted on behalf of Holmes, among others. The total
hours expended amount to approximately 1/2 of the time for
which Holmes is seeking reimbursement.

4.

I believe that the fees being sought here are both unreasonable
and unnecessary. Had Holmes accepted Mr. Spencer's offer to
defend them they would not have been incurred at all and since
Holmes' attorney has apparently expended almost twice what I
have, while defending a narrower set of issues, the amount of the
fees seems excessive.

5.

I drafted the alternative denial of paragraph 7 of Holmes' crossclaim because Holmes ignored Mr. Spencer's offer to defend and
never provided either my client or I with any communication
which would allow us to defend them beyond what was done.
We did file motions to dismiss, undertook discovery, and did all
other acts we could to remove Holmes from the suit, including
joining in the motion for summary judgment which ultimately
succeeded in accomplishing that end.

6.

Plaintiffs were not parties to the suit in which a lis pendens was once
filed upon the property and were not named in any way therein.

In spite of all that, the Court, in making its decision stated at page 26 lines 13-16 of
the October 6, 1997 transcript, "and the court finds after a thorough reading of the record
that there is simply no credible evidence that Spencer ever offered to defend Holmes."
(Emphasis added.) It is well established that a court, in considering summary judgment,
may not weigh or assess credibility of evidence. See, e.g., A.C. Financial, Inc. v. Salt Lake
County, 948 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1997); Munford v. Lee Sennngs Company, 2000 UT App
108, 999 P.2d 23 [f 15] (Utah App. 2000). Holmes's own case of Butterfield v. Okubo,
831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992), shows how little is needed to establish a dispute of fact. In

12

Butteifield, the Utah Supreme Court held that an expert's affidavit created an issue of
material fact defeating summary judgment. In that case, even though the affidavit failed to
address a major weakness of plaintiff s case, it did deal with one possible factual scenario
that would have allowed plaintiff to recover. That was enough to prevent summary
judgment.
Mr. Spencer, submitted an affidavit specifically alleging an offer to undertake
defense and a rejection of that offer. That raised a material issue of fact. Summary
judgment should not have been granted.
Similarly, both the affidavits of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Willardson provide specific
facts regarding the fees. The defense would have been undertaken by Mr. Spencer and Mr.
Spencer's counsel did the same or similar work in one half as much time. There is
therefore a disputed issue of material fact as to the necessity of the fees incurred. The
lower court could not have granted summary judgment against Mr. Spencer without
resolving that dispute against Mr. Spencer.
For the same reasons, there was a dispute of material fact regarding whether the
fees incurred were reasonable. Since a court may not award an unreasonable attorney fees,
this was also improperly resolved against Mr. Spencer. The deliberate abandonment of
Holmes's claim for attorney fees against plaintiffs, a fact that was before the court in
awarding the summary judgment appealed here, also suggests the attorney fees were
unreasonable or unnecessary.9
The issue of subrogation was decided against Mr. Spencer without any factual basis
at all. In a footnote of Holmes's reply brief, their counsel disclosed Holmes had not paid

9

The abandonment of the claim is shown as occurring in August 1999 R. 855-857: The
argument of the summary judgment appealed here occurred 10/6/99 R. 982-983; The
judgment was entered 2/3/00 R. 1359-1363.
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any legal fees, but the fees had been paid by an un-named title insurance company.10
Holmes's counsel asserted during oral argument the title insurance company was a
subrogee. There was no evidence offered of the basis of the subrogation, and even the
identity of the alleged subrogee, First American Title Insurance, was not disclosed until
oral argument. In spite of that the lower court assumed, and decided solely upon that
assumption, there was a factual and legal basis for subrogation, and Holmes was liable for
the attorney's fees sought.
Last, but not least, the affidavits, particularly that of Mr. Spencer, establish that Mr.
Spencer asked to defend Holmes and Holmes ignored him and refused to provide
information to allow such a defense to occur. In spite of that, Mr. Spencer did everything
possible to support and defend Holmes. There is no case law anywhere that holds a grantor
liable where the grantee prevents a defense by the grantor. The lower court resolved this
also against Mr. Spencer.
Each of those items requires reversal of the decision below.
D. HOLMES MIS-STATEMENTS THAT TEND TO MISLEAD THE
COURT.
Holmes makes a number of assertions in its brief that are demonstrably false. At
page 16 of its brief Holmes asserts that Mr. Spencer had issued "fraudulent deeds".
However, there is a final judgment which has not been appealed which holds that the deeds
were regular, proper, authorized, and not subject to challenge.11.

10

R. 862. Footnote 1.

11

Summary judgment dismissing Holmes, R. 681-690.
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At page 22 Holmes's brief states that there is no document anywhere in the record
regarding Mr. Spencer's offer to assist Holmes with their defense. In fact Mr. Spencer
submitted an affidavit to that effect.12
On page 29 Holmes's brief asserts that there are no examples of the duplicative
work between Mr. Spencer and Holmes. In fact, the order granting summary judgment
which dismissed Holmes from the case is entirely composed of bases included within the
Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss filed at the very inception of the case by Spencer, which
should have been granted. Starting with paragraph 11 of that judgment the Court made
findings that are precisely in line with Mr. Spencer's argument in his reply memorandum
in support of that motion. In addition, as was alleged in the hearing on October 6lh, 1997,
counsel for Holmes and counsel for Mr. Spencer conferred orally at the inception of the
case and throughout and Holmes's counsel declined to have Mr. Spencer's counsel assist.
At page 7 Holmes asserts Mr. Spencer did nothing at all to help Holmes. The truth
is to the contrary. Spencer's arguments regarding statute of limitations were adopted by
the Court in dismissing Holmes from the case. In addition, Spencer did not oppose
Holmes's motion and in fact joined in it.
At page 19 Holmes asserts the issue of the property being sold "as is" was not
raised until after the ruling. That is a misleading statement. The transcript of the October
6th hearing shows the issue of the "as is" title was both raised and argued prior to the
ruling.13 Mr. Spencer's counsel specifically referred to both the issues and the documents
proving those issues in the argument that preceded the ruling.14 The transcript shows the

12

R. 761-763.

13

10/6/99 Transcript pp. 18:20-19:8.

14

This was discussed on 10/6/99 Transcript pp. 17-20. The documents were given to the
judge at 10/6/99 Transcript pp. 17:11-17.
15

judge submitted his ruling without submission by Mr. Spencer's counsel.15 The only
things related to these issues that occurred after the ruling were the request that the
documents be admitted into the record16 and their subsequent admission to the record on
the motion for reconsideration.17
Another misleading inference appears on page 8 that an amount of $50,000.00 was
paid to Josephson. The cited support is two pages of transcript testimony from Mr.
Spencer where an escrow of $50,000.00 is referenced. Holmes's support for that statement
is Mr. Spencer's deposition, pages 181 and 182. On page 184 of that same deposition Mr.
Spencer testified that only $16,000.00 was ultimately paid to Mr. Josephson. While page
184 did not make it into the record Holmes used to support its motion for summary
judgment, it is clearly in Holmes's possession.
Holmes has also mislead the court as to the effect of the ruling it seeks to avoid.
Holmes has argued that reversing the decision below will "force those innocent parties to
bear the cost of defending against those claims." 18 That is far from the truth. When it
filed its answer, Holmes also filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs, seeking its "costs,
expenses, and attorney's fees."19 In drafting its summary judgment order, Holmes included

15

10/6/99 Transcript pp. 25: 18-20 shows that the lower court judge asked the parties if
they submitted, and then began announcing his decision as soon as Holmes's counsel
stated that it was submitted.

16

10/6/99 Transcript pp. 28:20-21:3.

17

R. 1204-1206, especially page 1205, f 9 (including all subparts); 1214-1221, especially
pages 1217^9.

18

Holmes's brief, page 13, lines 6 & 7.

19

R. 121.
16

its costs in the order, but omitted to apply for its attorney fees. 20 The judge below had
determined that plaintiffs claim as to Holmes was wholly without merit. In spite of that,
Holmes elected not to ask for attorney fees against the very persons who directly caused
the attorney fees to be incurred. Holmes went further by voluntarily stipulating to
dismissal of the counterclaim against plaintiffs.21 . There is no case law cited that allows
the grantee to refuse to collect its fees from the maker of a spurious claim merely so that
the grantoi can be disadvantaged. There is nothing, other than Holmes's own election,
which prevents Holmes from collecting its costs and fees from the plaintiffs who brought
the unlawful claim. Reversing the decision below will not disadvantage an "innocent"
grantee. Rather, it will prevent a grantee who was on notice that prior claims had been
made, and bought property "as is" anyway, from colluding with the people who attacked
the grantee's title and disadvantage the grantor.
As was argued at pages 13, 14, 15, et seq. of the October 6 hearing, one of the
prima facie elements to recovery of fees in this situation is that the fees have been paid. It
came out at the hearing, for the first time, that the nominal Holmes here is not the real
party in interest. The real party is First American Title.22 That fact was concealed until the
argument on the motion appealed here. Since Holmes apparently did not pay any fees
(they did not furnish an affidavit that they had and their reply brief says the fees were paid
by a title insurance company), we are dealing with an alleged subrogee's claim. Fees can
only be properly awarded to First American Title if there is either a legal or equitable basis
for subrogation. That was not even alleged by Holmes's counsel. The lower court had
neither a factual or legal basis to rule on such a claim.

20

R. 687

21

R. 855-857.

22

10/6/99 Transcript pp. 13:14-25.
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Far from punishing an "innocent" grantee, reversing the decision below will
promote fairness and justice by putting primary liability for bringing factually and legally
unjustified claims upon the parties who bring those claims. It will have the further
beneficial effect of preventing title insurance companies from concealing true interests
from the courts.
E. HOLMES IS RELYING UPON CONFUSION OF ISSUES AND TIMING
TO MISLEAD THIS COURT.
Holmes's brief makes several citations to the ongoing case between Mr. Spencer
and the Plaintiffs. Holmes fails to point out that case has not reached a final conclusion,
and there is no judgment entered. While the trial has concluded, and Judge Lewis has
announced the result that she intends to reach, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
have not been prepared, or entered. Judge Lewis may still amend her decision at any time
up to through entry of a judgment. Such a judgment, if entered, would be subject to appeal
and potential reversal. In fact, Judge Lewis indicated toward the end of her
pronouncements that her opinion of Mr. Spencer was ameliorating and that she believed
that whatever liability he had toward the Plaintiffs in the case not subject to punitive
damages, and not typical of his behavior in business (and therefore, by inference, not
willful).23
Another way in which Holmes is confusing the issues is their citation of the
ongoing lower court case as a basis for asserting the claim against Holmes was a lawful
claim. As is discussed above, the lower court has already found the claim for possession of
the property was not a lawful claim. The Court has also found the claim for title to the
property was not a lawful claim, being barred by the statute of limitations.

23

August 24, 2000 transcript (record page 1519) pp. 88:8-20.
18

The rules regarding statute of limitations require them to be plead with
particularity. Mr. Spencer's answer did so.24 Mr. Spencer sought to have the case
dismissed on that basis.25 Holmes did not file an answer until approximately a week after
Mr. Spencer filed his motion to dismiss.26 The summary judgment in favor of Holmes
against Plaintiffs specifically relies upon the statute of limitations.
Another bit of mis-direction by Holmes is the assertion that Judge Lewis' statement
that she was ruling in favor of Plaintiffs against Mr. Spencer on "all counts" put Holmes'
title in jeopardy. Since the quiet title count had previously been resolved in favor of
Spencer and Holmes the only possible meaning is Judge Lewis was resolving the
remaining counts (which applied only to Spencer) against Mr. Spencer.
F. THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS CASE THAT CAN TURN A CLAIM
WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT OR LAW INTO A "LAWFUL" CLAIM.
The appellate courts of Utah have not previously decided a case specifically
addressing the question of how the "lawful claim" language of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12
limits the liability of grantors under warranty deeds. The majority of jurisdictions with
such limiting language hold that a claim against title that fails, such as the one here, is not a
"lawful claim." Therefore there is no duty on the part of the grantor to defend. This Court
should clarify the meaning of the statute.
The cases cited by Holmes do not provide strong support for Holmes's position and
certainly do not compel this Court to adopt a legal interpretation that makes the statutory
limitation meaningless, as is urged by Holmes.

24

R. 92-93.

^

R. 89-91, 105-107

26

R. 89 shows the motion to dismissed was filed 9/9/97'; R. 108 shows Holmes' answer
was filed 9/15/97
19

All of Holmes's cases holding the giantoi liable do so only where the grantoi had
done something directly affecting the title giving rise to the suit That principle is
fundamentally different fiom the present case While Mi Spencei may or ma) not have
done something to render him liable for money damages to the Plaintiffs, it is conclusively
established heie27 the title was both regulai and pioper and pioperly conveyed It is further
conclusively established Plaintiffs are barred as a mattei of law from claiming title to the
piopeity
To adopt Holmes's aigument is to make the "lawful claim" language of the statute
completely meaningless Every lawsuit bi ought involves at least some allegations of
misconduct by the defendants Therefore, if Holmes's logic weie adopted, eveiy suit
which sought title, no mattei how tangential, unjustified, 01 spunous, would lequne a
grantoi to defend That cannot have been the legislative intent These woids must mean
something
It is conclusively established m this case Plaintiffs claim was without basis m fact
01 law If the "lawful claim" language of the statute means anything at all, it must mean
that a claim against title which is without basis m both fact and law is not included in the
wananty
V. CONCLUSION
Both sides are m agieement that the appiopnate standard of review for this mattei
is correctness Reversal is compelled both because the statute, Utah Code Annotated § 571-12 excludes unlawful claims such as the instant mattei, and because theie aie issues of
material fact which prevent summary judgment

27

Summary judgment dismissing Holmes R 681-690
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Mr. Spencer therefore respectfully requests this Court vacate the lower court
decision and enter a decision finding Mr. Spencer not liable for attorney's fees as a matter
of law.
Dated: Wednesday, May 9, 2001

Attorney Tor Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I Heieby Certify that I caused to be delivered as specified below on the date
specified below, two true and correct copies of the foregoing "Repl> Bnef of Appellant" to
the following
BiuceA Maak
Pan, Waddoups, Biown, Gee & Loveless
185 S State Street, Suite 1300
P O Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

Date

zA

May 9, 2001

90

Sent via
Mail
Facsimile
Hand-delivery

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT
CONDO 4, a Utah Partnership
Plaintiffs,
Appellate No. 20000508 CA
vs.
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual,
[APPELLANT] GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an
individual, SPENCER-GAMBLE
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP, a Utah
partnership, and JOHN HOLMES
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah Corporation
[HOLMES]

[Oral Argument Priority 15]

Defendants.
Addendum to Reply Brief of Appellant

Denver C. Snuffer #3032
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen P.C.
10885 S. State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
(801) 576-1400
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Bruce A. Maak
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless
185 S State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
ATTORNEY FOR HOLMES

Denver C. Snuffer # 3032
- ^ :;;r ,
Timothy Miguel Willardson # 4443
"'"•-- _ - ~ J~" 1[\ "
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
~^~~
Attorney for Defendants Spencer-Gamble Development Partnership and Thomas L* Spencer
10S85 South State Street *
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone (801) 576-1400
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE O? UTAH
PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMS
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT
CONDO 4, a Utah Partnership
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an. individual,
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership, and
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, IN
Utah Corporation
Defendants.

Civil No. 960908672 CV
Judge:

Comes now defendants Spencer-Gamble .Development Partnership and Thomas L. Spencer
("defendant" or "defendants") by and through the undersigned counsel of record and answer
plaintiffs complaint as follows:

Flr&t Affirmative Defense -•-.Pallurgi^
1*

Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

Among other defects, the complaint and attachments show that one of the plaintiffs, the putative
joint venture, ceased to exist thirteen or more years before this action was filed, if it ever existed.
There is no privity between any of the plaintiffs and any of the defendants other than Mr. Gamble*
Plaintiff Byington is, by the documents incorporated v/ithin the compliant, a stranger to the
transaction. Plaintiff Webster is not alleged to have had any activity of any kind, between the time
of the alleged joint venture formation and the filing of this action.

00077

r

Jr^'',\-3^Jl..^_A^°n^

Second Affjrfrrtat^'? Qg*q*iftfl 2.

Plaintiffs complaint i<. barred by Utah Cede Annotated §? 7M2-5, 7M2-6, snd 78-12-7

pertaining to real property and §§ 78-12-27, and 7S-12-25 **> to other claims.
Third Affirmative Dft*ftnpe - > c > ^ y
3.

Plaintiffs complaint is barred by the doctrine of Inches.

Fourth Jkfflrrnaflvg Q&1%r*$e* - /^fliifflefo^y ff P^Qj^ss
4.

Plaintiff has not caused defendant Tnomas 1. Spenre- to be personally served ir^ this

action* The summons and complaint sensed is addressed to "Spencer-Gamble Development
Partnership/ rather than to Vs. Spencer individually.
g

i1fth Affirmative Defense -

5.

fofty^cfortsy

^j3^y^^.^p^.f^}335.

Plaintiff has not caused iefendant Thomas L. Spencer to be personalJy served In this

action. The summons mi6 complaint served is addressed to "Spencer-Gamble Development
Partnership," rather than to Mr. Spencer individually.
Sixth Affirmative .Defend - Failure ol ConsfciarpfioTE
6.

Plaintiff has not provided consideration for the benefits claimed in plaintiffs' complaint.

Seventh A^lrmgl'v^ Deforce 7.

?^f±tf:^^.3l^

The complaint alleges plaintiffs are entided to ^ecove^ tinde*- a putative joint venture.

Defendants contend that no such join: venture was ever formed and therefore genera1 ly deny
plaintiffs claims.
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Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (2033)
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendant John Holmes Construction, Inc.
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: 801-532-7840
Fax: 801-532-7750

m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT
CONDO 4, a Utah partnership,

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 970300098
vs.
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual;
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual;
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership; and
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Utah corporation,
Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant John Holmes Construction, Inc.
came on regularly for hearing before the Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on
October 7, 1998 at 3:00 p.m., plaintiffs Paul Bymgton, James Webster and Summit Condo 4

appearing through their counsel, Mark C. Quinn, Esq. and defendant John Holmes
Construction, Inc. appearing through its counsel Bruce A. Maak, and the Court having
reviewed the memoranda and evidentiary materials submitted by the parties, having heard the
arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing
therefore, hereby makes and enters the following Determinations and Order:
Determinations
1.

There exist no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the

determinations set forth below.
2.

John Homes Construction, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Holmes")

purchased from Thomas L. Spencer a tract of land located in Summit County, State of Utah,
more particularly described on Exhibit "A" hereto (hereinafter referred to as the "Property").
Holmes paid Spencer the sum of $236,111.00 for the Property. Plaintiffs's counsel conceded
that the Court should assume that Holmes paid fair market value for the Property.
3.

At the time of Holmes's purchase of the Property, a Lis Pendens previously

recorded by William Josephson (the "Josephson Lis Pendens") had been released. Holmes in
any event never saw the Josephson Lis Pendens. The Josephson Lis Pendens, itself, did not
disclose the claims of plaintiffs with respect to the Property or any assertion that prior
transfers of the Property were unauthorized. The Josephson Lis Pendens did not give
Holmes constructive notice of the claims of plaintiffs in this action.

.0.
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4.

At the time of Holmes's purchase of the Property, and the recordation of the

Warranty Deed from Thomas Spencer to Holmes, Holmes did not have knowledge or notice
of the claims of plaintiff with respect to the Property.
5.

Plaintiffs recorded their Lis Pendens substantially after Holmes purchased the

Property. At the time Holmes purchased the Property, there was nothing in the public
record that gave Holmes constructive notice of plaintiffs's claims or of any deficiencies of
prior transfers of the Property.
6.

Meridian Title and James Ivins advised Holmes that there were no clouds on

Holmes's title and Holmes could prudently close the Property. Holmes was entitled to rely
on Meridian Title and James Ivins and was not obligated to make further inquiry or
investigation.
7.

Plaintiffs argue that Holmes was on notice of plaintiffs's claims in this action

at the time of its purchase because a copy of the Complaint filed by William Josephson was
in the files of Meridian Title, the title company that assisted Holmes with the closing of its
purchase. That argument is rejected for the following reasons:
(a)

Plaintiffs submitted no evidence that the Josephson Complaint .at the

time of the Holmes's purchase was in the files of Meridian Title or known to
Meridian Title.
(b)

The Meridian Title representative with whom Holmes dealt, James

Ivins, did not have knowledge of the Josephson Complaint at the time Holmes
purchased the Property.

-3-
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(c)

Neither Meridian Title nor James Ivins advised Holmes of the

Josephson Complaint, its content, or plaintiffs's claims prior to Holmes's purchase.
(d)

Neither Meridian Title nor James Ivins had such a relationship with

Holmes as would result in the knowledge of Meridian Title or James Ivins being
constructively imputed to Holmes.
8.

Whether or not the conveyance of the Property from Summit Condo IV to

Spencer-Gamble Development and the conveyance from Spencer-Gamble Development to
Thomas L. Spencer were unauthorized, beyond the scope of the authority of the signatories
of those conveyances, or otherwise subject to challenge by Summit Condo VI, Byington,
Webster, or any other partner in Summit Condo VI, those conveyances are effective with
respect to Holmes's ownership of the Property and are not subject to challenge by plaintiffs
with respect to the interest of Holmes in the Property because, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§48-1-7, Holmes acquired the Property from Thomas Spencer for value without knowledge
that the partners executing such prior transfers in making the conveyances exceeded their
authority.
9.

Holmes did not at the time of its purchase have actual knowledge of any defect

or deficiency in the authority of the partners to execute such prior conveyances and did not
have knowledge of any other facts that, to act in disregard of them, shows bad faith within
the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §48-1-2(1).
10.

Holmes purchased the Property for valuable consideration and recorded its

Deed prior to plaintiffs's recordation of their Lis Pendens without actual constructive notice

or knowledge of the claims of Byington and Webster. Therefore, the claims of plaintiffs
Byington, Webster and Summit Condo VI are void as against the claim of Holmes under the
Recording Act, Utah Code Ann. §57-3-3.
11.

The applicable limitations provision is Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5, which

requires that plaintiffs be seized or possessed of the Property within seven years before the
commencement of this action.
12.

Plaintiff Webster was not on the Property more than approximately four times

during the past fourteen years and plaintiff Byington was not on the Property more than two
times in the past sixteen years. Summit Condo VI did not hold record title to the Property
for in excess of fifteen years before this action was commenced. There is no evidence that
any party physically occupied the Property for or on behalf of plaintiffs within seven years
prior to the commencement of this action.
13.

Plaintiffs argue that Thomas Spencer and/or others engaged in fraudulent

concealment which tolled the running of the statute of limitations against Holmes. The Court
rejects this argument for the following reasons:
(a)

Holmes, itself, did not engage in, participate in, approve, or have

knowledge of the alleged fraudulent activities.
(b)

The alleged fraudulent activities were complete two and one-half years

before Holmes had any contact with or involvement with the Property.
(c)

Assuming that Thomas Spencer did engage in the fraudulent conduct of

which plaintiffs complain, Spencer so acted for his own account and not on behalf of,

n
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for the purpose of, with the knowledge of, or at the behest of, or for the benefit of
Holmes.
(d)

The relationship between Holmes and Spencer was limited to, that of

buyer-seller. That relationship is, as a matter of law, insufficient to allow the conduct
of Spencer to toll the limitations period with respect to claims against Holmes.
(e)

Plaintiffs's claims against Holmes are barred by the statute of

limitations, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5. "
Order
Based upon the foregoing Determinations, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and
Decreed as follows:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Holmes dated June 29, 1998 be and the

same is hereby granted.
2.

Plaintiffs's Complaint against Holmes be and the same is hereby dismissed

with prejudice and upon its merits.
3.

Neither Paul Byington, James Webster, nor Summit Condo VI have any right,

title, claim, or interest in any tract of land located in Summit County, State of Utah more
particularly described on Exhibit "A" hereto.
4.

The Lis Pendens recorded in the Summit County Recorder's office by

plaintiffs with respect to the claims asserted by them in this action on July 18, 1997 as Entry
No. 482932 in Book 1061 at Pages 249-250 be and the same is hereby released and
discharged from the record.

"6"
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Holmes shall recover his costs in this action m the amount of
from plaintiffs Byington, Webster and Summit Condo VI jointly and
severally.
MADE AND ENTERED by the Court t h i s t ^ 2

da

Y

of

/f^'r*^*/!'>"*.

1998.

BY THE COURT:

,>7
<L <>^C

Pat B. Brian
District Judge
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Approved as to form:

Mark C. Quinn, Esc
O'RORKE & GARDINER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

[aak, Of Counsel
, WADDOUPS, BROWN,
GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendant John Holmes
Construction, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY, CERTIFY that the foregoing Order Granting Summary Judgment was
served this / 3 Y ^ay of October, 1998, by mailing on said date copies thereof by United
States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to:
Patricia A. O'Rorke, Esq.
Mark C. Quinn, Esq.
O'Rorke & Gardiner
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
6995 Union Park Center, Suite 470
Midvale, Utah 84047
Frederick A. Jackman, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant George T. Gamble
1327 South 800 East, Suite 110
Orem, Utah 84097
Timothy M. Willardson, Esq.
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle
Attorneys for Defendants Thomas L. Spencer and
Spencer-Gamble Development Partnership
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

Kris Henriod, Secretary
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LEGAL
The land referred to is situated m

A

DESCRIPTION
Summit, and is described as follows-

BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS
EAST 2781.38 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE FROM THE SOUTHWEST COPNER OF
SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN;
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 239.84 FEET TO A POINT ON A 180.00 FOOT RADIUS
CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 1 DEGREES 11 MINUTES 44
SECONDS WEST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 86.30 FEET TO A POINT ON A
330.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 28
DEGREES 39 MINUTES 55 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 165.10
FEET; THENCE EAST 179 08 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 132.4 1 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 23
DEGREES 54 MINUTES 56 SECONDS EAST 49 33 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 119.17 FEET
TO THE SECTION LINE; THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST
440.00 FEET ALONG SAID LINE TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING
LESS THAT PORTION THAT LIES WITHIN QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 1.
LESS THAT PORTION THAT LIES WITHIN QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 2.
LESS; BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54
SECONDS EAST 3 04 5.18 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE AND NORTH 172.07 FEET
FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST,
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON A 921.00 FOOT
RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 2 DEGREES 4 9 MINUTES
56 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING THENCE ALONG SAID CURVE 111.20 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 80 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 74.84 FEET TO A POINT
ON A 39.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NOPTH 9
DEGREES 45 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 67 90
FEET; THENCE NORTH 54.78 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY
LINE OF MEADOW LOOP ROAD, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON A 180.00 FOOT RADIUS
CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 12 DEGREES 06 MINUTES 04
SECONDS WEST; AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 52.04 FEET TO A POINT ON A
330.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 28
DEGREES 39 MINUTES 55 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 64 93
FEET; THENCE SOUTH 62 DEGREES 00 MINUTES 54 SECONDS EAST 96.26 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 28 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 15 SECONDS EAST 75.98 FEET TO THE
POINT OF BEGINNING.
LESS; BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54
SECONDS EAST 3 085.38 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE FROM THE SOUTHWEST
CORNER OF SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND
MERIDIAN; AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 6 DEGREES 3 0 MINUTES 5 4 SECONDS WEST
125.00 FEET; THENCE NORTH 28 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 15 SECONDS WEST 7 05
FEET TO A POINT ON A 879.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT
BEARS SOUTH 1 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 38 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG
SAID CURVE 154.05 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 119.17 FEET TO THE SECTION LINE,
THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST 13 6.00 FEET ALONG
SAID SECTION LINE TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
OD462SOS
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Timothy Misuel Willardson # 4443
Denver C. Snuffer #3032
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Tom Spencer
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone (801) 576-1400
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT
CONDO 4, a Utah Partnership

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS L. SPENCER

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 970300098 QT

vs.
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual,
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual,
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership, and
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
Utah Corporation

Judge:

Defendants.
County of Salt Lake
State of Utah

)
) ss
)

COMES NOW THOMAS L. SPENCER, being duly sworn upon oath, and declares the following:
1. I am an adult, competent in all respects to testify before this court and have direct personal
knowledge of all matters affirmed herein.
2. I am a long-time Utah resident. My wife Wendy and I have owned residences in Utah since
1974. Although we have moved during that time, proceeds from the sale of each home were used to
purchase the next. We presently reside at property described as Lot 4075, Summit County, The
Jeremy Ranch Plat "4.".

nP^o *

3

In July of 1997, plaintiffs filed the instant action seeking to, primarily, obtain damages for the

alleged deprivation of pioperty described as
Paicel #4 Beginning at a point which is North 201 37 feet and East 3050 31 feet fiom the
Southwest comei of Section 30, Township 1 South. Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence North 28045,15" West 87^12 feet, thence North 62000,54"
West 96 25 feet, to a point on a 330 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears
South 17'23'22" East), thence easterly along said curve 100 16 feet to the point of said
curve, thence East 179.08 feet, thence South 142 49 feet to a point on a 911.0 foot radius
curve to the left (radius point bears South 06058'39" West), thence westerly along said
curve 151 08 feet to the point of beginning, Contains 0 63 Acre
4. Recently, Plaintiffs and then counsel have filed a notice of lis pendens, clouding the title to Lot
4075, Summit County, The Jeremy Ranch Plat "4." That property is the personal residence of my
family and is not at issue m this suit
5

My wife Wendy L Spencer, is a non-party m this action. Together we are the title holders of

said Jeremy Ranch property, as evidenced by the Warranty Deed dated January 10, 1997, on file
with the Summit County Recorder m book 01026, page 00009-00009
6

Demand was made via correspondence of January 13, 1999 personally addressed to each of

plaintiffs and each of plaintiffs' two attorneys, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-4, for
lemoval of the lien on said property That demand was refused m writing by Mr Qumn and
otherwise not responded to by any other addressees
7. Plaintiffs have no interest m or claim to the lesidential property of my wife and I
8. My wife and I are presently m the process of refinancing their home for the purposes of
lemodelmg, saving finance charges, and paying bills. We are unable to complete that refinancing
because of the lis pendens filed by plaintiffs and their attorneys.
9

The lis pendens filed by plaintiffs and their attorneys is a wrongful hen.

[){jW(

10.1 estimate that my damages due to loss of favorable interest rates, loss of ability to increase his
home value, and other factors that will obtain if the refinancing is not procured, will be not less than
$200,000.
Dated: July 22, 1999

<*&-

Thomas L. Spencer
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

i tuicry /I f^tirt
// YL
7T
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day of July, 1999.
Notary Public
Atece Morgan
10885 South State
Sandy, UT 84070
My Commission Expires
December 22, 2001
State of Utah
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10 I estimate that rny damages due to loss of favorable interest raiss loss of ability :o increase his
home value, and other factors that will obtain if :he refinancing is not procured will be no: less* than
$200,000
Dated Julv 22,1999

Thomas L. Spencer
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

C££.

<~ 6/

day of July, 1999
Notary Public
Alece Moroan
10885 Soutrf State
Sandy, UT 84070
My Commission Expires
December 22, 2001
State of Utah
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Timothy Miauel Willardson # 4443
Denver C. Snuffer #3032
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Tom Spencer
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone (801) 576-1400
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY

PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT
CONDO 4, a Utah Partnership

I AFFJDAVITX)F TIMOTHY MIGUEL
WILLARDSON

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 970600098 QT
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual,
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual,
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership, and
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
Utah Corporation

Judge: Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
County of Salt Lake
State of Utah

)
) ss
)

COMES NOW TIMOTHY MIGUEL WILLARDSON, being duly sworn upon oath, and declares
the following:
1. I am an adult, competent in all respects to testify before this court and have direct personal
knowledge of all matters affirmed herein.
2. My client, Mr. Spencer, has consistently directed me to take every action feasible to defend
Holmes and obtain a prompt dismissal of the action as to Holmes. I have followed that direction.

p
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All documents filed on my behalf m this case were drafted with the idea of removing Holmes from
the suit and defending their title to the property In every instance where we had a practicable
opportunity to attempt to defend Holmes or attempt to get them dismissed fiom the action, we took
that action Notwithstanding, my efforts to defend Holmes, Holmes elected to procure their own
attorney and elected to keep all communications related to their defense between themselves and
Mi*. Maak It was solely because of Holmes unilateral action that less than all of Holmes' title
defense was handled by me
3. I spent a maximum of 73.25 hours during 1997 and a maximum of 57.25 hours during 1998
and 1999 doing all of the same things as were done by Holmes' counsel in this action, as well as
taking care of additional matters, such as the motions to dismiss that were prosecuted on behalf of
Holmes, among others The total hours expended amount to approximately 1/2 of the time for
which Holmes is seeking reimbursement.
4. I believe that the fees being sought here are both unreasonable and unnecessary. Had Holmes
accepted Mi*. Spencer's offer to defend them they would not have been incurred at all and since
Holmes' attorney has apparently expended almost twice what I have, while defending a narrower set
of issues, the amount of the fees seems excessive.
5. I diafted the alternative denial of paragraph 7 of Holpies' cross-claim J^ecause Holmes ignored
Mi". Spencer's offer to defend and never provided either my client or I with any communication
which would allow us to defend them beyond what was done. We did file motions to dismiss,
undertook discovery, and did all other acts we could to remove Holmes from the suit, including
joining in the motion for summary judgment which ultimately succeeded m accomplishing that end

0(T<

6 Plaintiffs were not parties to the suit m which a lis pendens was once filed upon the property
and were not named m any way therein
Dated: Jul^22^1999

-imothy Miguel Willardson
Subscnbed and sworn to before me this

Notary •_

i

~

day of July, 1999.

Date-

> / : L O / ^

WGtaiy pu&ljc
}0m South State
.^WKtyUtah 84070
"wy commission E x p m
March 24, 2003
State of Utah
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Patricia A. O'Rorke. #2252
O'RORKE & ASSOCIATES

6965 Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801)569-3131
Telefax(801) 569-3434
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL BYINGTON. an individual,
JAMES WEBSTER, an individual, and
SUMMIT CONDO 4, a Utah partnership

STIPULATED ORDER
DISMISSING COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,
v.
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual;
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual;
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership; and
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

Case No. 970300098 QT
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

Based upon the stipulation of Plaintiffs Paul Byington, James Webster and Summit
Condo 49 a Utah partnership. b}r and through their attorney, Patricia A. O'Rorke. and Defendant
John Holmes Construction, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Holmes"), by and through its attorney,
Bruce A. Maak, and the record in this action, and good cause appearing therefore,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

On or about September 12, 1997, Holmes filed its Answer, Counterclaim and

Crossclaim. Its Counterclaim sought a Decree quieting title in Holmes as against Plaintiffs and
all those claiming by, through and under Plaintiffs in and to certain property and certain other
relief.
2.

An Order Granting Summary Judgment dated October 27, 1998 herein dismissed

the Plaintiffs' Complaint against Holmes with prejudice and upon its merits, adjudicated that
Plaintiffs have no claim to the property in question, and granted certain other relief, including an
award of costs, to Holmes.
3.

The Order Granting Summary Judgment fully adjudicated Holmes's Counterclaim,

and there exist no further claims remaining to be adjudicated between Plaintiffs and Holmes.
4.

Plaintiffs have paid Holmes' costs in the amount of $2,643.

ENTERED this / 7 day of August, 1999.
BY THE COURT

A'y^S1

Honorable Pat B. Brian
Third District Judse
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Stipulated and approved:
O'RORKE & ASSOCIATES
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Patricia A. O'Rorke
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

faak
jys for Defendant
John Holmes Construction, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and con-ect copy of the foregoing STIPULATED
ORDER DISMISSING COUNTERCLAIM was sen'ed by U.S. Mail, First Class, postage
prepaid, on the , ' ^

day of August, 1999 on:
Frederick A. Jackman
1327 South 800 East. Suite 110
Orem,UT 84097
Brace A. Maalc
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Timothy Miguel Willardson
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE

10855 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
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Timothy Miguel Willardson 4443
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 3032
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas L. Spencer
and Spencer-Gamble Partnership
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT
CONDO 4, a Utah partnership,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

REPLY TO "DEFENDANT
HOLMES' RESPONSE TO
SPENCER'S OBJECTION TO
HOLMES' PROPOSED JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF JOHN HOLMES
CONSTRUCTION AND AGAINST
THOMAS L. SPENCER"

THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual;
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual;
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership; and
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Case No. 970600098
Judge Pat B. Brian

COMES NOW Defendant Thomas Spencer and replies to Holmes Construction's
memorandum as follows:
1.

Holmes' memorandum to which this Reply is merely a restatement of the

argument that Holmes has put forward before. Holmes' memorandum contains no citations to
the record and does nothing to clear up the question of what actually was announced by the
Court at the conclusion of the October 6th hearing. In addition to that shortcoming, the
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memorandum states as established or stipulated a number of items which are disputed by
Defendant Spencer.
2.

With regard to paragraph 7 Holmes' memorandum asserts that the parties agreed

that Holmes' paragraph 7 "should be adopted." The undersigned did not agree that it should
be adopted, only that the Court could adopt it if the details of what was actually plead were
unimportant to its rulings.
3.

With respect to paragraph 8 of Holmes' proposed order, the memorandum

completely misinterprets Spencer's position. Spencer's position with respect to the alleged
duty to defend was that was an allegation of a legal conclusion and that was a legal conclusion
which, under the definition and statutes related to warranty of title, they were obligated to
deny. Spencer has previously pointed out that Holmes has never done anything to allow a
defense to be maintained by Spencer and to call the two sentence allegation of a legal
conclusion in a pleading a sufficient tender, particularly since Holmes had already selected
their own counsel and mounted their own defense, is factually unwarranted and legally
unsound.
4.

As has been pointed out both in previous memoranda and in oral argument,

there is nothing on the record that shows that there was an irremediable conflict of interest. In
addition, the record is clear that Holmes did nothing to raise any potential conflict of interest.
Far from being a good faith attempt to have Spencer defend the action on behalf of Holmes,
Holmes' conduct with respect to this matter has been to make its own decisions, mount its own
defense, hire its own lawyer and then to attempt to get Spencer to pay for it on a retroactive
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basis by bootstrapping a single two sentence allegation with absolutely no good faith effort
being taken toward allowing Spencer to defend. Had Holmes actually requested that Spencer
undertake a defense, there would have been some communication as least with Mr. Spencer.
As is shown in the attached documents, Holmes' title insurance company had a specific written
contractual obligation to notify Spencer in writing if they wanted indemnification. There is no
evidence in the record that that was done, because it was not done.
5.

With respect to paragraph 10 Holmes' memorandum asserts two contradictory

things: The first is that Holmes' proposed order paragraph 10 includes items that were briefed
and argued only; the second is that that expansive extension of the Court's actual holding was
part of the Court's holding. In fact the Court made none of the findings which Holmes is
attempting to have this Court adopt retroactively.
6.

As was discussed in our telephone conference call, the proper way to resolve

this is to have Your Honor review the record and then make an appropriate decision regarding
the two proposed orders. The undersigned is confident that at the conclusion of that review it
is Spencer's proposed form of order that will be entered rather that Holmes'.
DATED this / 7

;

day of November, 1999.
NEL^OS^SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
Timothy Miguel Willardson
Attorney for Defendants Thomas L. Spencer
and Spencer-Gamble Development
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to either be placed in the United States mail, first class,
postage prepaid; faxed; and/or hand-delivered; a true and correct copy of the foregoing
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT HOLMES' RESPONSE TO SPENCER'S OBJECTION TO HOLMES' PROPOSED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION
AND AGAINST THOMAS L. SPENCER" to the following:

Patricia A. O'Rorke
GIAQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER &
PETERSON
170 South Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Sent via:
i .Mail
te—

Facsimile
Hand-delivery

Mr. Frederick Jackman
1327 South 800 East, Suite 210
Orem, UT 84097

Sent via:
1 Mail
—v—
Facsimile
Hand-delivery

Bruce R. Baird
201 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Sent via:
I Mail
Facsimile
Hand-delivery

Bruce A. Maak
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless
185 S State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

Sent via:
i / Mail
Facsimile
Hand-delivery

DATED this

day of November, 1999
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GRANTEE'S ADDRESS

22401

WARRANTY

D E E D

THOMAS L. SPENCER
f

grantor

P21RK CITY

U, "T

County o f SUMMIT

S t a t e of

h e r e b y CONVEY (S) AND WARRANT (S) TO

JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION
grantee

of PARK CITY

County of SUMMIT

State of Utah

for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND ai'IIER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

DOLLARS

the following described tract of land in Summit

County,

State of Utah, to-wit:
REFER TO LEGAL DESCRIPTION ATTACHED HERETO

SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS, RESTRICTIONS AND RIGHTS OF WAY CURRENTLY OF RECORD,
AND GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEAR 1996 AND THEREAFTER.
WITNESS the hand(s) of said grantor(s) this
Signed in the presence of

Septeanber 10, 1996

THOMAS L. SPENCER

STATE OF UTAH
) ss.
COUNTY OF SUMMIT
, personally appeared
On
September 11, 19 S 6
before me, THOMAS L. SPENCER
the signer (s) of the foregoing instrument, whis being by me duly sworn,
acknowledged to me that
executed the same\
My Commission Expires: l\-J\-^'^)
NdriRY PUBLIC
Residing at; ' 1

ooLrw

M SUSAN JOHNSON

V^IL-CX-^

(WD Rev.6-87)
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DESCRIPTION

The land referred to is situated in Summit, and is described as follows.
BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NOPTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS
EAST 2781.38 TEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF
SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOU1H, RANGE 4 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN,
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 239 84 FEET TO A POINT ON A 180 00 FOOT RADIUS
CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 1 DEGREES 11 MINUTES 4 4
SECONDS WEST), AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 8 6 3 0 FEET TO A POINT ON £
330.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THL RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 28
DEGREES 39 MINUTES 55 SECONDS EAST), AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 165 10
FEET; THENCE EAST 179.08 TEET, THENCE SOUTH 132 41 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 23
DEGREES 54 MINUTES 56 SECONDS EAST 4 9.33 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 119 17 FEET
TO THE SECTION LINE, THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST
440.00 FEET ALONG SAID LINE TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
LESS THAT PORTION THAT LIES WITHIN QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 1.
LESS THAT PORTION THAT LIES WITHIN QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 2.
LESS; BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54
/ SECONDS EAST 3045.18 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE AND NORTH 172 07 FEET
FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST,
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON A 921 0 0 FOOT
RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 2 DEGREES 4 9 MINUTES
56 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING THENCE ALONG SAID CURVE 111.20 FEET,
THENCE SOUTH 80 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 74.84 FEET TO A POINT
ON A 39.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 9
DEGREES 45 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 67.90
FEE1; THENCE NORTH 54.78 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY
LINE Or MEADOW LOOP ROAD, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON A 180.00 TOOT RADIUS
CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 12 DEGREES 06 MINUTES 04
SECONDS WEST; AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 52.04 FEET TO A POINT ON A
3 3 0.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 2 8
DEGREES 39 MINUTES 55 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE C4.9J
FEET, THENCE SOUTH 62 DEGREES 0 0 MINUTES 54 SECONDS EAST 9 6.26 TEET,
THENCE SOUTH 28 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 15 SECONDS EAST 75 98 FEET TO THE
POINT OF BEGINNING.
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LESS; BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54
SECONDS EAST 3085.38 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE FROM THE SOUTHWEST
CORNER OF SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND
MERIDIAN; AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 6 DEGREES 3 0 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST
d I 125.00 FEET; THENCE NORTH 28 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 15 SECONDS WEST 7.05
\*-l TEET TO A POINT ON A 879.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT
BEARS SOUTH 1 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 3 8 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG
SAID CURVE 154.05 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 119.17 FEET TO THE SECTION LINE;
THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST 136.00 FEET ALONG
v SAID SECTION LINE TO THE POINT Or BEGINNING.

U

ORDER NO. 224 01

Accepting Office
ASSOCIATED 1 ITc COMPAQ
Address 1755 PROSPECTOR AVE, PAR) CITY
OR#
22A01
Filing Reference 22401

INDEMNITY AGREEMENT III
(Off-Record

THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this

11

Hatters)

day oSeptember

1996

(

by and between

THOMAS L SPENCER

hereinafter (collectively if more than one) referred to as "lndcimitor," and
hereinafter referred to as "
ASSOCIATED TITLE
'*.

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY

1
Indemnitor is the owner of and/or has some interest in that certain real property hereinafter referred to ns
"the property," located in the County of SUMMIT
, State of Utah, described as follows.
REFER TO LEGAL DESCRIPTION ATTACHED HERETO

2. Indemnitor is contemplating encumbering and/or selling the property and has requested ASSOCIATED TITLE
to issue its policy of title insurance in connection theiewith
3. An examination of the Official Records of said county and other aspects of title to the property discloses the
following matter or matters not shown b/ such Official Records heieinafter refeired to as "the off-record matter"
affecting the property.

ANY PERSON CLAIMING AN INTEREST PURSUANT TO JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT ATTACHED AS
EXHIBIT "A" TO THE COMPLAINT IN THE ACTION ENTITLED "WILLIAM JOSEP11SON AND THOMAS
L. SPENCER IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH CLAIM
NO.
9603006OPR.

4. Indemnitor, regardless of his interest in oi rel.it lonship to the Pioperty, has an interest in the issuance of and
desires ASSOCIATED TITLE
to issue its policy or policies of title insurance insuring an owner
or owners of the Property, and/or insuring holders of mortgages or deeds of trust encumbering the property against
loss by ieason of the off-record matter
5. ASSOCIATED TITLE
is willing to consider the issuance of such policy or policies of title
insuiance as Indemnitor has requested, insuring against loss by reason of the existence of the off-record matter,
however, ASSOCIATED TITLE
sh.jl I determine whether to issue each policy based on reliance on the
covenants, conditions, representations and warranties of Indemnitor herein made, and upon a determination by
ASSOCIATED TITLE
that each and every covenant to be performed by Indemnitor has, as a condition
precedent to such issuance, been performed.

h

IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUANCE by ASSOCIATED TITLE
of each policy of title insurance as
ASSOCIATED TITLE
shall decide to issue insuring against loss by reason of the existence of the
off-record matter, Indemnitor agrees as follows:
6

Indemnitor shall deposit with

ASSOCIATED TITLE

AUTHORITY OF THOMAS L. SPENCER TO EXECUTE WARRANTY DEED TO JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, AS GRANTEE

as partial security for this indemnification.

1

Indemnitor shall, concurrently herewith, submit to ASSOCIATED TITLE
an audited financial statement,
or the ASSOCIATED TITLE
form financial statement if no audited statement is available and, if
ASSOCIATED Tl H E
elects to accept an unaudited statement from Indemnitor, which statement shall
accurately represent the financial condition of Indemnitor. Indemnitor further agrees to amend such statement upon
the occurence of any event which would alter or in any respect change said financial condition by reducing the net
worth, result in a reduction of liquidity, or other similar manner which would be materal to ASSOCIATED TITLE
's
descision to continue issuing policies in reliance on the financial condition and this agreement.
(In the event more than one person is Indemnitor, each such person shall comply with this paragraph.) Any mis-statement
of such condition, or failure to submit an amendment thereto or omitting to submit an amendment, as to the Indemnitor so
rms-stating or omitting to submit on amendment shall constitute actual fraud against ASSOCIATED TITLE
such that any obligation incurred by ASSOCIATED TITLE
under this Indemnity shall not be dischargeable in

•

22401

.

64 SUSAN JOHNSON

.

—

,

„

,

,

.

,

(INDEM OFF; 7/94)

.

,

,

,

,

,

,.,-..

.

.

•

' I

A

r

f\ C\

Oi i U

any insolvency proceeding
ASSOCIATED TITLE

whether involuntary or voluntary and further, shall constitute actuol fr^ud against
for any and all purposes

7
Indemnitor hereby promises and agrees that ASSOCIATED TITLE
shall have and is aranted the right
at any tune to examine the booJ s accounts, ana recoras of Indemr to- pe-ta r "g ^o + nanc a condition or inoenini ior
and indemnitor will upon request furnish to ASSOCIATED TITLE
for examination all such books accounts
and iecoids and such further assurances as ma/ be required by
protection fiom liability
£3

/SS0C1ATED "ITLE

for its or its insured s

In the event that any action is filed in Idw or equit> or any procedure instituted relating to the off record matter

indemnitor agrees to notify

ASSOCIATED TITLE

in writing of such action or procedure of which Indemnitor

shall b/ uny means whatsoever become aware withu three (3) days of acquistion of knowledge or such action or procedure
9

Upon the filing of any action at law or in equity of any pi ocedure relating to the off-record matter

ASSOCIATED TITLE

shall, in its absolute subjective opinion

itself or its insured or insureds,

ASSOCIATED TITLE

Indemnitor agrees to comply therewith
A

or an/ time

deem necessary in order to protect

shall have absolute right to demand

and

that Indemnitor

In situations where the payment of any sum of money will discharge or eliminate the affect of the off record matter
as to Lhe property, Indemnitor shall upon demand of

ASSOCIATED TITLE

cause such sum of money as is

sufficient to so discharge or eliminate the off record matter to be paid in such a manner as to effect such discharge
or el limnatt on
B

or

In situations where affirmative legal action or proceedings in law or in equity are necessary to effect discharge
or elimination of the off record matter as to any effect it may have on the Property
, cause counsel

of ASSOCIATED TITLE

Indemnitor shall, upon demand

acceptable to ASSOCIATED TITLE

to institute

such action or procedure as will so discharge or eliminate the effect of the off record matter as to the property,
and to cause to be delivered to

ASSOCIATED TITLE

a written representation by such counsel to the

effect that such counsel has accepted employment as counsel to commence and vigorously prosecute to conclusion such
action or procedure, or
C

In situations where any action or procedure concerning Die off record matter is instituted by any party other than
ASrUClATED TITLE

or Indemnitor, Indemnitor shall, upon demand by ASSOCIATED TITLE

,

cause such action or procedure to be timely defended and resisted by counsel acceptable to ASSOCIATED TITLE
which counsel will piotect

ASSOCIATED TITLE

and any person or insured to whom ASSOCIATED TITLE

may hnvp possible liability as n result of issuance or a policy or policies of title insui ance pursuant to this agi ee
ment, and cause to be delivered to

ASSOCIATED TITLE

a written representation by such counsel to the effect

that such counsel has accepted employment as counsel to defend any such action or resist any such procedure and will
undertake any and all steps necessary to protect
D

ASSOCIATED TITLE

Take action with respect to the off-record matter as
discretion
by

and its insured or insureds, or

ASSOCIATED TITLE

shut I, m

its absolute subjective

authorize Indemnitor in wnting to undertake, provided that any such authority shall not be a waiver

ASSOCIATED TITLE

C above, within five (5) days of

to, at any Lime, require Indemnitor to comply with subparagraphs A, B and
ASSOCIATED TITLE

's written revocation of authority to take action

other than that under subparagraphs A, B and C, and demand for Indemnitor to comply with subparagraphs A

B and C

above
Jn the event Indemnitor foils to comply with subparaqraphs A, B, C or D, above,
shall hnve the right

ASSOCIATED TITLE

in addition to any and alt recourse available to ASSOCIATED TITLE

under this

agieement or under I > or equity but not the obligation, to take or do any act, in the name of Indemnitor or otherwise,
as ASSOCIATED TITLE
protect U s
10

shirt I, ir U s absolute subjective opinion deem necessary or desirable to

interests under this agreement, or the interests of its insured or insurcdb

Notwithstanding any other recourse available to

ASSOCIATLD TITLE

under this agreement or other

wise at law or in equity, Indemnitor (and each of them jointly and sever Iy if more than one) hereby agrees to hold and
and save

ASSOCIATED TITLE

harmless

and to protect and indemnify ASSOCIATED TITLE

from and against any and all liabilities or claims of liability, losses, costs, charges

expenses and damages of any

kind or character whatsoevei, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred or sustained by ASSOCIATED TITLE
by reason of or arising out of the off-matter, which ASSOCIATED TITLE

may incu- oi sustain directly

or indirectLy, under any policy of title insurance issued pursuant to this agreement, or which ASSOCIATED TITLE
may sustain or incur in any other action at taw or in equity under any theory of recovery as a result of the existence
of the off record matter
11

Indemnitor agrees that ar y monies advanced by

agreement or by

ASSOCIATED TITLE

Indemnitor to ASSOCIATED TITLE

ASSOCIATED TITLE

pursuant to this

's exercise of any rights hereunder given shall be repaid by
with interest thereon at four percent (4%) above the then prevailing

prime rate as charged by Bank of America at date of the advance of any sum or sums hereunder, but in no event to exceed
ten percent (10%) per annum, from the date of such advance, within ten (10) days of

ASSOCIATED TITLE

demand therefor
12

Indemnitor further agrees that any monies or other security deposited with

without any demand or notice to indemnitor whatsoever be used by ASSOCIATED TITLE
liability for which ASSOCIATED TITLE

ASSOCIATED TITLE

may
to discharge any

is indemnified hereunder, including but not hunted to using

any portion of such monies or security up to the whule thereof to cause or obtain a discharge or elimination of the
effect of the off record matter on the property

13

Where, in ASSOCIATED TITLE

ASSOCIATED TITLE

's absolute subjective opinion, all matters for which

is indemnifled hereunde

are resolved in such a manner that

can hove no further liabiht> under its policy or policies
ASSOCIATED TITLE

's sole option

by Indemnitor hereunder to Indemnito-

ASSOCIATED TITLE

ASSOCIATED TITLE

may at

return or oraer, budi monies o~ secur t, as ra, ha e been dcpnsirpri

No i eturn of such secunt> shall be construed as a termination of indemnitor s

duties hereunder or of this agreement
14
Indemnitor recognizes and acknowledges that in the event of any default or failure by indemnitor to perform as
agreed heiein would give ASSOCIATED TITLE
tlie right to exercise any and ull remedies available nt law
or in equity including but not limited to injunctive relief, specific performance, and damages for breach of the
terms hereof
15

The failure of

ASSOCIATED TJTLE

to demand by Indemnitor the performance of any act hereunder

shall not be construed as a waiver of

ASSOCIATED TITLE

's right to demand, at an> subsequent tune

such

performance
16

This Agi eement is between Indemnitor and ASSOCIATED TITLE

only, and is not intended to be

nor

shall it be construed as being for the benefit of any third party or parties
17

In the event any provision of this Agreement shall be held invalid or unenforceable by any court of competent

jurisdiction, such holding shall not invalidate or fender unenforceable any other provision hereof
10

This Agreement contains the entire agreement of tlie parties, and shall not be modified except by an instrument in

writing executed by all of tlie parties hereto
19

A

The terms of this Agreement shall hove the following meaning unless the context requires otherwise
(1)

The term "Propei ty" shall lefer to that cci tain property or an interest therein as set out above, and include
any and all poitions thereof

(2)

Tlie term "policy" shall refer to and include a policy or policies of title insurance and/or endorsements
thereto.

B.

Whore more than one person is included as Indemni tor, tlie obligation undertaken by Indemnitor shall be joint and
several.

C.

The singular number shall include the pluial number throughout this Agreement.

D.

This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and bind the personal representatives, successsors, and assigns of
the parties hereto.

20. This Agreement shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and Indemnitor hereby agiees
to submit himself to the competent jurisdiction of any Utah Court or Federal Court having competent jurisdiction of
ASSOCIATED TITLE

's choosing, and to make no objection to venue therein, should any action in law or

or equity be necessary to enforce or interpret this agreement
or interpret the terms of this agreement,

If any action at law or in equity is necessary to enforce

Indemnitor further agrees to reimburse

ASSOCIATED TITLE

for any costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and/or necessary disbursements for such action, in addition to any other
relief to which

ASSOCIATED TITLE

may be entitled

21. NOTWITHSTANDING AMY POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE IN THE PARITY OF THE PARTIES HERETO, IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY INDEMNITOR THAT
ASSOCIATED TITLE

IS UUDERTAkING A RISK SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN THAT UNDERTAKEN IN THE NORMAL

COURSE OF PROVIDING TITLE INSURANCE POLICIES AND RELATED SERVICES BY ENTERING INTO THIS AGREEMENT AND ISSUING
POLICIES TO TJTLE INSURANCE IN RELIANCE HEREON AND, TllERFORE, INDEMNITOR HEREBY DECLARES ITS WILLINGNESS TO ENTER
INTO THIS AGREEMENT AMD INDUCING

ASSOCIATED TITLE

TO ENTER INTO THIS AGREEMENT, REAL121NG THAI

INDEMNITOR'S BEST INTEREST, IN THE OPINION OF THE INDEMNITOR, IS BEING BEST SERVED THEREBY.

INDIVIDUALS

Q120G

COMIdONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE
SCHEDULE A
Commitment No. 50942
Effective Date : July 12, 1996

at 8:00 A.M.
Amount

>olicy or Policies to be issued:
X
X

ALTA Owner's Policv (10-17-92)
Standard Coverage
Extended Coverage

$
Premium S

Proposed Insured : JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah Corporation

X ALTA Loan Policy (10-17-92)
Standard Coverage
X Extended Coverage

Premium $

Proposed Insured :

Endorsements

The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment and
covered herein is Fee Simple
and is at the effective date hereof vested in:
THOMAS L. SPENCER (PARCEL 1) ; RICHARD UHL HOVEY and LISA HOPKINS HOVEY, Trustees or
Successors of the RICHARD and LISA HOVEY FAMILY TRUST, U/A dated September 27, 1989 and
DONALD L. CRAIG (PARCEL 2)

The land referred to in this commitment is situated in the County of SUMMIT
State of Utah, and described as follows:
See Exhibit "A"
Address :

Escrow Officer: ALLAN

COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY

Counter Signec
Authorised Officer or Agent

:>r Questions regarding Items disclosed in this commitment please call

at 264-8889.

F i l e No.
50S42-AB
LL, DESCRIPTION
Exhibit

"A

Lnnmg at a point which is North 89 degrees 15'54" East 2781.38 feet along
Section line from the Southwest corner of Section 30, Township 1 South,
je 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 23 9.84 feet
= point on a 180.00 foot radius curve to the left (radius point bears North
egrees 11'44" West); and running along said curve 86.30 feet to a point on a
.00 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears South 28 degrees
55" East); and running along said curve 165.10 feet; thence East 179.08
t; thence South 132.41 feet; thence South 23 degrees 54'5G" East 49.33 feet;
nee South 119.17 feet to the Section line; thence South 89 degrees 15'54"
t 440.00 feet along said line to the point of beginning.
s that portion that lies within QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 1.
s that portion that lies within QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 2.
s; Beginning at a point which is North 89 degrees 15'54" East 3 04 5.18 feet
>ng the Section line and North 172.07 feet from the Southwest corner of
•tion 30, Township 1, South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said
.nt also being en a 921.00 foot radius curve to the left (radius p c i m bears
Lth 2 degrees 49'56" East); and running thence along said curve 111.20 feet;
:nce along said curve 111.20 feet; thence South 80 degrees 15'00" West 74.84
t to a point on a 39.00 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears
:th 9 degrees 45'00" West); and running along said curve 67.90 feet; thence
:th 54.78 feet to a point on the Southerly right of way line Meadow Loop
ad, said point also being on a 180.00 foot radius curve to the left (radius
m t bears North 12 degrees 06'04 n West); and running along sard curve 52.04
Bt to a point on a 330.00 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears
nth 28 degrees 39'55 n East); and running along said curve 64.93 feet; thence
uth 62 degrees 00'54" East 96.26 feet; thence South 28 degrees 45'15" East
.98 feet to the point of beginning.
ss; Beginning at a point which is North 89 degrees 15 ; 54 n East 3 085.38 feet
ong the Section line from the Southwest corner of Section 30, Township 1
uth, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North 6
grees 30'54" West 125.00 feet; thence North 28 degrees 45'15" West 7.05 feet
a point on a 879.00 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears Sout
degree 29'38" East); and running along said curve 154.05 feet; thence South
9.17 feet to the Section Line, thence South 89 degrees 15'54" West 136.00
et along said Section line to the point of beginning.
iRCEL 2 :
aginning at a point which is North 8 9 degrees 15'54" East 3 045.18 feet along
is section line and North 172.07 feet from the Southwest corner of Section 3C
Dwnship 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point also
sing on a 921.00 foot radius curve to the left (Radius point bears South 2
agrees 49'56" East); and running thence along said curve 11.20 feet; thence
uth 80 degrees 15'00" West 7.84 feet to a point on a 39.00 foot radius curvc the right (radius point bears North 9 degrees 45'00" West); and running
Continued)

0J£03

No.

50942-A3

LEGAL CONTINUED
along said curve 67.90 feet; thence North 54.78 feet to a point:
on the Southerly right: of way line of Meadow Loop Read, said
point also being on a 180.00 foot: radius curve to the left
(radius point bears North 12 degrees 06'04" West); and running
along said curve 52.04 feet to a point on a 330.00 foot radius
curve to the right: (radius point bears South 2 8 degrees 39'55"
East); and running along said curve 64.93 feet; thence South 62
degrees 00'54 M East 96.26 feet; thence South 28 degrees 45'IS"
East 75.93 feet to the point of beamninc.

p ' rs r\ f
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COMMITMENT? FOR T I T L E

INSURANCE

SCHEDULE B

File Number: 50942
Schedule 3 of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following
ters unless tne same are disposed of to the satisfaction of tne Company
Any facrs, n g n t s , interests, or claims whicn are not shown by the public records but whic
could be ascertained by an inspection of the land or w m c n may be asserted by perscns m
possession, or claiming to be m possession, tnereof.
Easenents
records

liens, encumbrances, or claims tnereof, which are not shown D V the public

Discrepancies, conflicts m boundary lines, sncrtage m area, encroachments, or any other
facts which a correct survey of the land would disclose, and which are not shown by the
public records.
Any lien, or right to a lien, imposed by tne law for services, labor, or material
heretofore or hereafter furnisned, whicn lien, or rignt to a lien, is not shown by the
oublic record
(a) Unpatented mining claims; (b) reservations or exceptions m patents or m Acts
authorizing the issuance tnereof, (c) Indian treaty or aboriginal rignts, including, but
not limited to, easements or equitable servitudes, or, (d) water rights, claims or title t
water, whether or not tne matters excepted under (a) , (b) , (c) , or (d) are snown by tne
public records.
Taxes or assessments which are not now payable or which are not shown as existing liens b^
the records of any taxing authority that levies taxes or assessments on real property or }
tne public records, proceedings D V a public agency w m c h may result in taxes or
assessments, or notices of such proceedings, whether or not snown ny the records of sucn
agency or by the public records
Any service, installation, connection, maintenance or constuction charges for sewer, wate
electricity, or garbage collection or disposal or other utilites unless shown as an
existing lien by the public records.
Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any created, first
appearing m the public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but
prior to tne date the proposed insured acquires of record for value the estate or mteres
or mortgage thereon covered by tnis Commitment.
Taxes for the year 1996 now a lien not yet due and payable. Taxes for the year 1995 HAVE
NOT BEEN PAID m the amount of $68.99, plus penalties and interest
Property ID No
PP-S1-B. For further information contact the SUMMIT County Treasurer at 336-4451.
(PARCEL 1)
Taxes for the year 1996 now a lien not yet due and payable. Taxes for tne year 1995
have been paid in the amount of $88 74 Property I D. No PP-91-B-1. (PARCEL 2)
tmued)

EXCEPTIONS CONTINUED
The subject property lies within the boundaries of tne PARK CITY SEWER. DISTRICT and is
sujD]ect to any and all cnarges and assessments tnereof.
Pnone* 645-5000
Tne subject property lies w i t n m tne boundaries of tine WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT and is sujojecz
no any and all cnarges and assessments tnereof.
Pnone: 359-4454
The subject property lies w i t n m the boundaries of SNYDERVILLE SEWER and is sutject tc
any and all charges and assessments tnereof.
Phone: 649-7393
The suD]ect property lies within tne boundaries of PARK CITY FIRE and is subject to
any and all charges and assessments tnereof.
Pnone: 649-6706
An Easement including its terms, covenants and provisions as disclosed by instrument;
To:
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE and TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a Colorado
Corporation, its successors, assigns, lessees, licensees and
agents
PurposeA right of way Eastment and the right to construct, operate,
maintain and remove sucn communication and onner facilities,
from time to time, upon, over, and across
Recorded:
March 29, 1982 as Entry No. 189886 in Book M215 at Page 702 of
Official Records.
AffrCtS:
SAID PROPERTY
The matters set forth m the document shown below which, among otner things, contains
or provides for. certain easements, liens and the subordination tnereof, provisions
relating to partition; restrictions on severability or component parts, and covenants
conditions and restrictions,
Recorded.
July 1, 19S2 as Entry No. 193163 m Book M224 at Page 555 of
Official Records.
The matters contained within tnat certain Modification(s) of said covenants,
conditions and restrictions,
Recorded.
June 14, 1988 as Entry No. 291746 in Book 481 at Page 01 of
Official Records
A Deed of Trust to secure an indebtedness m the amount snown oelow, and any other
obligations secured thereby,
Amount.
$30,000 00
Dated
November 18, 1994
Trustor:
THOMAS L. SPENCER
TrusteeFIP.ST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, a Utah Corporation
Beneficiary:
CYPRUS CREDIT UNION
Recorded:
November 23, 1994 as Entry No 419822 m Book 852 at Page 519 c
Official Records. (PARCEL 2)
tmued)

Ui - ± i

EXCEPTIONS CONTINUED
14.

The ter^s, covenant, conditions, and restrictions of that certain "Consent Agreement"
sy and between DONALD CRAIG, RICHARD anc U S A HOVEY, THOMAS 1 SPENCER, and Summit
Pnn-T-T £_ ^QI icical subdivis~ on of *~h^ CJ—*"** ^~ i"?—^^
Recorded
July n , 1995 as Entry No. 433144 m Book 8S4 a: Page 108 of
Official Records

15.

Tne terms, covenants, conditions, and restrictions of that certain "Consent Agreement"
by and between DONALD CRAIG, RICHARD and LISA HOVEY', THOMAS L. SPENCER, and Summit
County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah.
Recorded.
February 27, 1996 as Entry No 4489S7 m Book 947 at Page 411 of
Official Records.

16.

A pending court action as disclosed by Instrument;
Plaintiff:
WILLIAM JOSEPHSON
Defendant:
THOMAS L. SPENCER
County.
Summit
Court:
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Civil No.:
96030O060PR
Purpose.
Action may affect the title to, or the right of possession of,
real property.
Recorded:
April 26, 1996 as Entry No. 453039 m Book 960 at Page 521 of
Official Records.

TOTE:

OTE:

Exception Numbers 1 tnru 8 will not appear m
hereunder

the Mortgage Policy to be issaed

Judgments have been searched m the names of THOMAS L. SPENCER, RICHARD UHL HOVEY
and LISA HOPKINS HOVEY, trustees or successors of the RICHARD and LISA HOVEY
FAMILY TRUST, U/A dated September 27, 198 9 and DONALD L. CRAIG for the past eignt
years and none were found of record except as snown ar>ove

TOTE:

A cancellation fee of $12 0.00 will be billed for this commitment if a Policy of
Tiule Insurance is not issued w i t n m 12 0 days

TOTE:

Any matter m dispute between you and the company may be subiect to arbitration as
an alternative to court action pursuant to the Title Insurance Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association, a copy of which is available on request
from the company. Any decision reached Dy arbitration shall De binding upon both
you and the company The arbitration award may include attorney7 s fees if allowed
by state law and may be entered as a judgment m any court of proper
jurisdiction.

bTOTE .

The Escrow officer assigned to this file is ALLAN. For questions regarding your
closing please call ALLAN at 264-8888.
This file was examined by Sean. Any questions regarding items in this commitTent
Dlease call Sean at 264-8889.

01

Commitment ror Titls Insurance
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, herein called the company, for a valuable consideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the proposed
Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described or referred
to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedules A and B and
to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof.
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the policy or policies
committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time of the issuance of this Commitment
or by subsequent endorsement.
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability and obligations
hereunder shall cease and terminate 120 days after the effective date hereof or when the policy or policies committed for shall
be issued, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the fault of the company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Company has caused its Corporate Name and Seal to be hereunto affixed; this instrument,
including Commitment, Conditions and Stipulations attached, to become valid when countersigned by an Authorized Officer or
Agent of the Company.

Conditions and Stipulations
1. The term mortgage, when used herein, shall include deed of trust, trust deed, or other security instrument.
2.

If the proposed Insured has or acquires actual knowledge of any defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter
affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other than those shown in Schedule B
hereof, and sh^Jil fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in writing, the Company shall be relieved from liability for
any loss or damage resulting from any act of reliance hereon to the extent the Company is prejudiced by failure to so disclose
such knowledge. If the proposed Insured shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if the Company otherwise
acquires actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter, the Company at its option
may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall not relieve the Company from liability
previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions and Stipulations.

3.

Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such parties included
under the definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed fo: and only for actual loss Incurred in reliance
hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements hereof, or (b) to eliminate exceptions shown in
Schedule B. or (c) to acquire or create the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered Dy this Commitment. In no event
shall such Liability exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the policy or policies committed for and such liability is
subject to the insuring provisions, the Conditions and Stipulations, and the Exclusions from Coverage of the form of policy
or policies committed for in favor of the proposed Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part
of this Commitment except as expressly modified herein.

4. Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may have or may bring against the Company arising out
of the status of the title to the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment must
be based on and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment.

R E A H O P®

This is a legally binding Cc act Utah Slate Law requires that licensed real estate agents use this form bt fluyer and the Seller may
legally agree in writing to alter or delete provisions ot this lorm II you desire legal or tax advice consult your attorney or tax advisor

IOIUL HOUSIMO

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
The Buyer

- T O ^

^VoL'V^

(tA^A&LMXt

t,

>^ I 0> Li

offers to purchase the Properly described below and delivers

l
to Brokerage as Earnest Money Deposit $
i^ ^ ^
in the form of
Co v'AfHv-H
within three business days after Acceptance ol this offer to purchase by all parties

CoUP)u^*J.. Q?L^\JJr(K_^
Brokerage

1

PROPERTY

City

WlvL

G^MX-M

r U&Tx<C~

L>n'i-L\'ibO
Receivea oy
Phone Number

lfiAPvAnq-^S>

CATH

County

to be deposited

on

(Da'e)

OFFER TO PURCHASE
TO
rv "vL

S^W\^^vrT

Utah

1 1 Included Items Unless excluded herein this sale shall incluoe all fixtures presently attached to the Property plumbing healing air conditioning and
venting fixtures and equipment water heater built-in appliances light fixtures and bulbs bathroom fixtures curtains and draperies and rods window and
door screens storm doors window blinds awnings installed television antenna satellite dishes and system wall to-wall carpets automatic garage door
opener and transmitter(s) fencing trees and shrubs The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of
Sale with warranties as to title
1 2 Excluded Items The following items are excluded from this sale
PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING Buyer agrees to pay ior the Properly as follows
\ OTTO
£L

Earnest Money Deposit

-&*
% i A V ^ I^OTJ

Existing Loan Buyer agrees to assume and pay an existing loan in this approximate amount presently payable at $ .
per month including principal interest (piesently at
% per annum) D real estate taxes D properly insurance premium
and D morlgage insurance premium Buyer agrees to pay any transfer and assumption fees Seller D shall D shall not be
released from liability on said loan Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual
balance at Closing shall be adjusted in D Cash D Other
Proceeds from New Loan Buyer reserves the right to apply for any of the following loans under the terms described below
D Conventional D FHA D VA D Other
Seller agrees to pay $
toward
Discount Points and Buyer s other loan and closing costs to be allocated at Buyer s discretion
• For a fixed rate loan Amortized and payable over
years interest shall not exceed
% per annum monthly principal and
interest payment shall not exceed $
or
D For an Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Amortized and payable over
years initial interest rate shall not exceed
% per
annum initial monthly principal and interest payments shall not exceed $
Maximum Liie Time interest rate shall not
exceed
% per annum
Seller Financing (See attached Seller Financing Addendum)
Other
Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Closing

$j j l ^ ^ t r o

Total Purchase Price

$

J21

^

2 1 Existing/New Loan Application Buyer agrees to make application lor a loan specilied above within
'
calendar days (Application Dale) after
Acceptance Buyer will have made Loan Application only when Buyer has (a) completed signed and delivered to the Lender the initial loan application and
documentation required by the Lender and (b) paid all loan application lees as required by the Lender Buyer will continue to provide the Lender with any
additional documentation as required by the Lender If within beven calendar days after receipt of written request from Seller Buyer fails to provide to Seller
written evidence that Buyer has made Loan Application by this Application Dale then Seller may prior to the Qualification Dale below cancel this Contract
by pi uvidinq written notice to Buyer The Brokerage upon receipt ol a copy of such written notice shall release to Seller and Seller agrees to accept as
Sellei s exclusive remedy the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization from Buyer
2 2 Qualification Buyer and the Property must quality for a loan for which application has been made under section 2 1 within v()fi
calendar days
(Qualification Date) after Acceptance 1 he Property is deemed qualified if on or beJore the Qualification Date the Property in its current condition and for
the Buyer s intended use has appraised ata value not less than the Total Purchase Price Buyer is deemed qualified if on or before the Qualification Date
the Lender verifies in writing that Buyer has been approved as ol the verification date
2 3 Qualification Contingency If Seller has not previously voided this Conlract as provided in Section 2 1 and either the Properly or Buyer has failed to
qualify on or before the Qualification Date either party may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party within three calendar days
after the Qualification Date otherwise Buyer and the Propei ty arc deemed qualified The Brokerage upon receipt ol a copy ol such written notice shall
leturn to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization of Seller
3 CLOSING This transac lion shall be closed on or before
Closing shall occur when (a) Buyer and Seller have
signed and delivered to each other (or to the escrow/Ml^ company) all documents requued by this Conlract by the Lender by written escrow instiucttons
and by applicable law and (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the escrow/title company in the form ol
cashier s check collected or cleared lunds Seller and Buyer shall each pay one half (112) ol the escrow Closing fee unless otherwise agreed by the parties
in writing Taxes and assessments for the current year rents and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in this Section Unearned
deposits on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of "0 date of Closing D date of
possession D other
.
4 POSSESSION Unless otnerwise agreed in writing by the pirties Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within
4=-. hours after Closing
5 CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE At the signing of this Contract the listing agent

S^C K .

V-W^r L^

represents

V Seller G Buyer and the selling agenfoffaik y^O^^IfttffcI^^JUepresenls
(IT) Seller ^ B u y e r Buyer^and Seller confirm that prior to signing this
Contract written disclosure of the agency relationshtp(s) was provided to him/her fa-W^V Buyers i n i t i a l s X ^ f i >" Seller s Initials
<<K
6 TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE (a) Sellei has or shall have at Closirfe fee title to the Propertfanr/agrees to convey such title to Buyer by
general warranty deed Wee of linancial encumbrances as warranted under Section 10 6 (b) Seller agrees to pay for and furnish Buyer at Closing with a
current standaid lorm owner s policy of title insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price (c) the title policy shall conlorm with Sellei s obligations
undei subsections (a) and (b) above Unless otherwise agiced under subsection 8 4 the commitment shall conform with the title insurance commitment
provided under Section 7
7 SELLER DISCLOSURES No late/ than
2
calendar days alter Acceptance Seller will deliver to Buyer the following Seller Disclosures (a)
a Seller property condition disclosui e f or the Property signt-d and dated by Seller (b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance required under Section
6 to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller including copies ot all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment (c) a copy ol all
loan documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber the Property alter Closing and (d) a copy of all leases affecting the Property not
expiring prior to Closing Seller agrees to pay any title commitment cancellation charge under subsection (b)
8 GENERAL CONTINGENCIES In addition to Qualificalion under Section 2 2 this offer is (a) subject to Buyer s approval of the content of each of the items
referenced in Section 7 above and (b) ^Q is D is not subject to Buyei s approval of an inspection of the Property The inspection shall be paid for by Buyer
and shall be conducted by an individual/company of Buyer s choice Seller agrees to fully cooperate with such inspection and a walk through inspection
under Section 11 and to make the Property available for the same
B 1 Buyer shall h a v e ^ O calendar days alter Acceptance in which to review the content of Seller Disclosures and il the inspection contingency
applies to complete and evaluate the inspection ol the Propeity and to determine if in Buyers sole discretion the content ol all Seller Disclosures
(including the Property Inspection) is acceptable
8 211 Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure or the Property Inspection within the time provided in subsection 8 1
above that document or inspection will be deemed approved or waived by Buyer
8 3 If Buyer objects Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar days alter receipt of the objections to resolve Buyer s objections Seller may but shall not
be required to resolve Buyer s objections II Buyer s objections are not resolved within the seven calendar days Buyer may void this Contract by providing
written notice to Seller within the same seven calendar days The Brokerage upon receipt of a copy of Buyer s written notice shall return to Buyer the
*. » . _ rk
4 M n n h n r 0 n •"•^m £l n»of a m/iMr»i^r W r.nona l .thnn7atinnfmmSp|ler If this Contract is not voided by Buyer Buyers objection is

9. SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. This , ler is made subject t o : .
The terms of attached Addendum ti _
_are incorporated into this Contract by this relerence.
10. SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Seller's warranlies to Buyer regarding the condition of the Property are limited to the following:
10.1 W/ien seller delivers possess/on ol the Property to Buyer, il will be broom-ciean and free of debris and personal belongings;
10.2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixtures, heating, cooling, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler
systems, appliances and fireplaces in working order;
10.3 Seller will deliver possession of the Properly to Buyer wild the roof and foundation free ol leaks known to Seller;
10.4 Seller will deliver possession ol the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Property in working order and in compliance
with governmental regulations;
10.5 Seller will be responsible lor repairing any ol Seller's moving-related damage to the Property;
10.6 At Closing, Seller will bring current all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer and will discharge all
such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed; and
10.7 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge ol any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the Properly which
has not been resolved.
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. Before Closing. Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to
determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1,10.2,10.3 and 10.4 are in the warranted condition and to verily items included in Section
1.1 are presently on the Property. II any item is not in the warranted condition. Seller will correct, repair or replace it as necessary or, with the consent ol
Buyer, escrow an amount al Closing to provide lor such repair or replacement. The Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" inspection, or to claim
during the "walk-through" inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced in Section 1.1, or is not in the condition warranted in Section
10. shall nol constilute a waiver by Buyer ol Buyer's rights under Section 1.1 or of the warranties contained in Section 10.
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, no new leases entered into, and no substantial
alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate or other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf
warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Selier Disclosures constitute the entire Contract
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the
parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parlies agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the Earnest
Money Deposit, the breach or termination ot this Contract, or the services relating to this transaction, shall first be submitted to mediation in accordance
with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules ol the American Arbitration Association. Disputes shall include representations made by the
parties, any Broker or other person or entity in connection with the sale, purchase, financing, condition or other aspect ot the Properly to which this Contract
pertains, including without limitation, allegations ol conceaiinent, misrepresentation, negligence and/or Iraud. Each party agrees lo bear its own costs ol
mediation. Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the mediation shall be binding. If mediation tails, the procedures applicable and remedies
available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. By
marking this box D , and adding their initials, the Buyer (
). and the Seller (
), agree that mediation under this Section 15 is not mandatory, but is
optional upon agreement ol all parlies.
16-DJ=FAULT. II Buyer delaults. Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or tn rptt irn thp Farnpsi Mnnpy Dffpnsil /
and sue BuTeTTircrYfew^e-Sfilie^shghts. If Seller dejajilJs^a^dirroTTro return ol the EarnestMoney Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from Seller as *
liquidated damages, a s n f n e n j j a p r u ^
nrtn*.ng Seller tor specific performance and/or damages. If Buyer elects to accept the «
liquidateddaj]]ag^3rSEfle7l3grees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand WnVrp n SftRPTi i nf II lis Ponirftflt-proyHp? a sppp'fin r ^ P ^ Y l n e
parties"1ntend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless ol rights which might otherwise be available under common lav/.
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
1B. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless il is authorized by: (a) Section 2, Section B.3 or Section
15; (b) separate written agreement of the parties; or (c) court order.

19. ABROGATION. Except lor express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions o( this Contract shall not apply alter Closing.
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk ol loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing.
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set lorth in this transaction. Extensions must be agreed to in writing by all parties.
Performance under each Section ol this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date.
22. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS. Facsimile transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission ol any signed facsimile transmission,
shall be the same as delivery of an original. II the transaction involves multiple Buyers or Sellers, facsimile transmissions may be executed in counterparts.
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an oiler or counteroffer ol the other: (a) signs the oiler or counter where noted
to indicaye^cceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the other parly's agent that the oiler or counteroffer has been signed as required.
) TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. BuyeV oilers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If Seller does nol accept this offer by
1 PM Mountain Time

U | (lj>

19 _{-lp—. this offer shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money

A

frfi -Ak,

(Offer Date)

(Oiler Date)
(Buyer's Signature)
The above date shall be the Ofier Relerence Date.

'Wft \^< Utft % m W \k<- ^Wirto
(Phone)

(Notice Address)

(Phone)

(Notice Address)

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER
CHECK ONE:
D Acceptance of Ofier to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Notice Address)

(Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Notice Address)

D Rejection: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer..

_ (Time)
_ (Seller's initials)
(Date).
ISi Counter Oiler: Seller presents lor Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modifications as specified in the attached
/Counter Otter #

/ 4 ••••

jQ/J

/ ^ ^A*/*4,

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State Lav/ requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore
be completed).
A. D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the ioregoing Contract bearing all signatures:
SIGNATURE OF SELLER
SIGNATURE OF BUYER

Date
B. D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be mailed on .
certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller D Buyer, Sent by

.19-

-by
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ADDENDUM/COUNTER-OFFER

NO._J
PFA i TD

TO

<ut„ou,1Ho

ft®

S»»o•7 uNn T

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS AN Q ADDENDUM D COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference
Date of / 3 P £ / L _ " Z - ^
19^ C , between ZJOtiA! Un/M£^
C.0tJ<T(^UCtfO^
,
as Buyer, and Pir iT A/Ol/EV &Ot^ CP^lG
/WQ TpA^ rsPgOCFft
as Seller.
The following tenns are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent that they modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC,
including all prior addenda and counter offers, these tenns shall control. All other tenns of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counter
offers, not modified shall remain the same:

f*-

(7-)

3

Cljl^lfiJG-

boc^^r/076

SA/a/f

Ocr<*i? / O X ; Q ^ / _ V

A^bb&AUr^Cr^

?Q

Fc)£ <>(*£>/«'ttiD>J

[int^

In

//AJA.E^

THF

B/J^F£

///>?,

rSn/i^iT C nu*ST y

(H) <;MJ.£&< <,},.£ &££6lA£Sr- IF fyrffzZ P<LFAOLJ<> /', ^BC^muftC
Of-TMT- Pg()F>EZJV
A/j)^(F- fo;TH lrH£<£7i;lrAj
OF AfJV A£riJiT£CriAfi«<- /)^/>^//J(rS THAT tJizCjf_. Ppqi/'££-£>
/*7 T/V^ Poi/^T
pF C&J76M-T.

] SellLr^3 Buyer shall have until _ "" S"
D A.M. ETP .M. Mountain Time
, to accept the terms of this
AD1JENDUM/C0UNTER OFFER in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of THE REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth
in\his AD^E^DUM/COUNTER OFFER shall lapse.

U Buyer O Seiter Signature

Date

Time

D Buyer D Seller Signature

Date

Time

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER
CHECK ONE:
D ACCEPTANCE of ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER: • Seller D Buyer hereby accepts the tenns of this ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER.

D Buyer D Seller Signature

Date

Time

D Buyer D Seller Signature

Date

Time

o i 91 n

NO. A
*

TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

R£ALT0R

THIS IS AN Q ADDENDUMjfi COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE RURCHASE CONTRACT (Die "REPC") with an Offer Reference
Date of . , / ^ A ^ ' . ^ " ^ , • ' i 9 - ^ 2 , between
^ A /?/f
/fc/vzz.^
as Buyer, and _/TV^E- HiruW
OcTvi (Ztinsfr
c^^cJ
Tc^t

C ^ Y ^ T4<O . - . / C ^
$ ? ^ c ^ ^

,
as Seller

Hie following \i-Tm^ a r e hcrcb) nfeorporated as pan of (he REPC, and to the extent thdt tliey modify or conflict wi th any provisions of the REPC,
including all pnP r addenda and counter offers, these terms shall control All other tenns of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counter
offers, not modfi£d 5^aJJ remain the same

•{

The filers appreciate the Buyer's offer and accepts trie Purchase Contract from John Holmes
Construct l n c - d a t e d A P n l 25 > 1 9 9 6 « except for the following revisions, all other terms reman*
the same;

2.

Purchase Contract, paragraph 2:
£ a r n e s t Money Deposit shall be $1,000.00.
Thera shall be an additional non-refundable deposit of $21,500.00 on or before May 24, 1996.
Balance in cash at closing shall be $402,500.00

3

The Earnest Money Deposit shall be immediately deposited upon acceptance, if for any reason
the property is not acceptable to the Buyers on or before May 24,1996, the Broker is hereby
directed to immediately refund the earnest money deposit to the Buyer without further written
authorization from the Sellers and this contract shall become null and void upon such refund.

4

Both the earnest money deposit and the additional non-refundable deposit totaling $22,500 00,
become non-refundable after May 24, 1996, with rjo exceptions and shall be immediately
released to the Sellers without prejudice or recourse from the Buyer.

5hail

5

Paragraph 1 t 2 and 4 of Addendum Ho. 1 shall be aejetea.

6

The due diligence period described in Paragraph 8.1 QI me r u . chase Contract shall be through
May 24, 1996.

7

P a r a p h 2.3 of the Purchase Contract is deleted in its entirety.

8

paraph's
con£

9

rac

10.1 through 10. 5 and 1 1 , of the Purchase Contract are not applicable to this

^

The Buyer acknowledges that the property will be conveyed "As Is".

Page 1 o( 2 pages

Seller's Initials ( P ^ T ) Date J ^ 2 £ £

Buyer's Initials (

) Date

o

pi

•**

*s¥

10.

The Buyers acknowledge and accept the current state of zoning on an "As Is" basis including
the current state of compliance to Summit County zoning and development regulations and that
the Consent Agreement by and between the Sellers, Craig, Hovey, and Spencer and Summit
County dated June 12, 1995, concerning the property is not final and certain development
requirements remain to be fulfilled.

11.

The Buyers acknowledge receipt of all Seller Disclosures pursuant to paragraph 7 of the
Purchase Contract which includes a copy of said Consent Agreement, minutes]from Summit
County records pertinent to said Consent Agreement, existing plans and maps land a
preliminary title report; and that the Buyer acknowledges the Buyer has seen for it's self the
condition of the property and accepts it "as is".

12.

The Buyer will obtain it's own survey.

13.

The Sellers will cooperate with the Buyers and provide all information in the possession of the
Sellers to the Buyers but makes no warranty as to such information completeness or accuracy.

14.

The Buyer shall have until 5:00 pm, MDT, April 30, 1996, to accept the terms of this Addendum
And Counter Offer in accordance to the provisions of Section 23 of the Purchase Contract.
Unless so accepted this offer as set forth herein shall lapse and be null and void.

y

3'.3o

Tt^

time

time

Seller signature, Thomas L. Spencer date

/

/

time

Please Check One
ACCEPTANCE:

The Buyers hereby accept the terms of this Addendum & Counter Offer.

Buyer signature,

date

time

Buyer signature,

date

time

REJECTION:

The Buyer rejects the foregoing Addendum & Counter Offer.

Buyer signature,

date
- 2 -

time

ADDENDUM/eOUNTER-aFFKir

NO._^Z__
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

°PP°nTUM'TY

THIS IS A N ^ D D E J ^ U M D £ O U N T J E R OFFER to diat REAL ESTAT£ PURCHASE^ONTRACT (the "£EPC") with an Offer Reference
Date of
s^rPc/f
^ — ' . 1 9 ^ 6 * . between v / c ^ O - V / / £ / ^ n i S
^ ^ 5 ^ ^ ^
-J-s^'C- .
s
as Buyer, and' ,/^TA.'/£.
^OiSt?y
, J^h^r
^ ^ ^ V
&^~c(
"TBr^-^ 3 / P ^ r r g ^ "
as Seller.
The following tenns are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to theextent that diey modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC,
including all prior addenda and countei offers, these tenns shall control. All other terms of die REPC, inci uding all-prior addenda and counter !
offers, not modified shall remain the same:
/ • &

^2

(7^

i

77$

jPe^

SAc.

a Cox

MrryvP/d.

7p

PC«y^
4>

/?/&+*/c//

CL^xd

7

i-rrv

^
err-

CP/?7C'<T^7

r?//

rr>^-

/

-

f

-ffftL

7/7/e

&-£

^^7tZ

^im-rtrc

c-Jj

^^^ce/^u^^r~

-/c?

6Qr7(\c7*\

/<7z T^CL.

7/uL.

&£.

/^&/e&££c7

f

-TO

s

ZP^

^7

p4/<

cTF

d'dft7tc^vr^-7~

&•

~7<0

~-^ruz_ ~

C'tCSt^cz-

pth—

pfa^e?r&*?A

"

Z2-

i2e rtcrys*
a^\d

/$
^

7777*

^7

C'cD.

~//lC

C^CcC/7<fc/

C^Cd^^n—

,€trcL

a,t«

<?r-<u&<yC &

^-rWWV1

, . ^ / ^ W ~ ^

77

J<

c/^/

/£&^-&

^(P&O

-~

,

^e^ctryi

/7+<z^r7

^<? //th^z

&®^r/^ft>£>7 /&&/*/<?f

-7(73, 7^9^

77^/^u^

fyz&f

^<?/~<r_c 7o

r<z7e&<;€

7z?

TSt^&v-

Tip/Tib* 7e<7

a^^c//^ry-

^/cry?- p(97^<7^6<e

[
E Seller D Buyer shall have until ^ "
D A.M. T& P.M Mountain Time
\
, 19J_£_, to accept the terms of this
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER in accordance widi the provisions of Section 23 of THE REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set fortli
in'this ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER shall lapse.

\_y r

<^-)\w^ 7% i iv

Ul Buyer D Seller Signature

Date

Time

D BuyerlSfSeller Signature

Date

Time

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER
CHECK ONE:
iACpCEPTANCE of ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER: D Sellei D Buyer hereby acce^hejerms-of-diis ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER.

'_ 7^7y-^~~ w'l~?£
O Buyer ^ S e l l e r Signature

Date

Time

D BuyerHi>eiler Signature

Date

Time

D REJECTION: D Seller D Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER.
(Initials)
(Date)
(Time).
• COUNTER OFFER: D Seller D Buyer presents as a counter offer die terms set fortli on die attached Counter Offer #

.

ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER

NO. 3
TO
PrAI TOP®

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS ANIBM
B ADDENDUM D COUNTER OFrER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (die "REPC") with an Offer Reference
Date of / I P kit- ^ 6
, 19*1 L , h a ween ~~V)t-\N Hb^E^
tXJ^*51PunT
lOO
i rJC^
,,
as Buyer, and AlC C A/fy/fV
ftflrJ
C k/Vfr . A^L
TH/n
^PZticS.
fc.
as Seller
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent that they modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC,
including all pnor addenda and counter offers, these terms shall control All other terms of uie REPC, including all prior addenda and counter
offers, not modified shall remain the same

(J) / 6 PE£ ^ECT/or^J
Q) ALL

bl^E/l

6

7FP/*vS

QPTH£ A?£PC /)G£££^E/JT, T/V£ CODSfAJC i)A)T£
Of 7^E

A<Z&F£mPK\T t^Ct-tibl/OG* ^ECRQN* * ?

of

s D Buyer shall have unt if ~>
D A M D P M Mountain Time AUGUST ZO'. i9±L, to accept the terms of tins
AD£fi^pcJM/COUNTER OFFER in accordance with the pros lsions of Section 23 of THE REPC Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth
ifins A^DoWDUM/COUNTER OFFER shall lapse

{*L^\^

EZB uyeKJ SeV|er Signature

ft

Dale

\^ A

Time

D Buyer D Seller Signature

Date

Time

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER
CHECK ONE:
D AgCEPT^NCE ofAUDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER: D Seller D Buyer herebpeeep* the terms of this ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER

D Buyer & Seiic^&gnature

Dale

Tune

D Buyer £ t Seller Signature

D REJECTION: D Seller D Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
(Initials)
(Date)
(Time).

Date

Time

ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
NO._M
TO

REALTOR®

EOU>lHOUS1HO

0PPORTUH,T

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

'

THISISANrfADDENDUMDCOUNTEROFFERtoUmtREALESTATEPURCHASECONTRACTC^
of "rA,u
- -*>
19 IL . between
"Jo- ~
,o , • >r ^ f 0 ^ . ~ / v , • <• -r „ , ,
, „, <as Buyer, and I ic K IH-\ r , / „ , , . , f f , <-_
/,"M r
- , />
- r r h >r ^ y
'
"
~
'
_
—
—
——
—
^_^
__
as Seller.
me following terms are liereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent that they modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC
including ail prior addenda and counter offers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counter
offeis, not modified shall remain the same:
Dale

D Seller D Buyer shall have until
• A.M. D P.M. Mountain Time
__ 19
l 0 accept the terms of this
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER in acco.dance with the provisions of Section 23 of THE REPC. Unless S c e n t e d , the offer as set forth
, , / " ^ " H h s ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER shall lapse.

D Buyer^Seller Signature

CHECK ONE:

~ ^

:

Km7~

D Buyer ^ S e l l e r SignTture

^ T

~Km7"

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER

D ACCEPTANCE of ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER: Q Seller D Buyer hereby accepts the terms of ihis ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER.

D Buyer D Seller Signature

Date

Time

D Buyer D Seller Signature

Date

Time

D REJECTION: Q Seller D Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER.
(Initials)
(Date)
(Time).
- a oft„n«pr Mi^r th* t.rmc cpt fnrih nn ihp niinrhed Counter Offer #

\j J. C w

X

